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RESTORING THE LOST ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
Kristin E. Hickman* & Gerald Kerska†
Should Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents be eligible
for pre-enforcement judicial review? The D.C. Circuit’s 2015 decision
in Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Department of the Treasury puts its
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act at odds with both general
administrative law norms in favor of pre-enforcement review of final
agency action and also the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
nearly identical Tax Injunction Act. A 2017 federal district court
decision in Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, appealable to the Fifth
Circuit, interprets the Anti-Injunction Act differently and could lead to
a circuit split regarding pre-enforcement judicial review of Treasury
regulations and IRS guidance documents. Other cases interpreting the
Anti-Injunction Act more generally are fragmented and inconsistent.
In an effort to gain greater understanding of the Anti-Injunction Act
and its role in tax administration, this Article looks back to the AntiInjunction Act’s origin in 1867 as part of Civil War–era revenue
legislation and the evolution of both tax administrative practices and
Anti-Injunction Act jurisprudence since that time.
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INTRODUCTION

T

IMING matters. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the Supreme
Court recognized in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) a
presumption in favor of judicial review of final agency actions.1
Consistent with that presumption, the Abbott Labs Court adopted a
general policy of reviewing final agency action, including but not
necessarily limited to legally binding agency regulations, on a preenforcement basis.2 This presumption spares regulated parties the
Hobson’s choice of “comply[ing] with . . . requirement[s] and
incur[ring] the costs of changing” business practices or “follow[ing]
their present course and risk[ing] prosecution.”3 Courts and

1

387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
Id. at 139–41; see Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative
Law, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 689, 702 (1990) (observing that Abbott Labs
“establish[es] a presumption in favor of judicial review”).
3
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152.
2
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commentators alike defend pre-enforcement review as essential to public
confidence in the quality and legitimacy of agency action.4
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
States, the Supreme Court proclaimed that it was “not inclined to carve
out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”5 But
the Abbott Labs presumption of reviewability for final agency action is
rebuttable; Congress can and often does create exceptions.6 In Florida
Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, a divided panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit interpreted a provision of the
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) known as the Anti-Injunction Act
(“AIA”)7 as precluding pre-enforcement judicial review of one set of
Treasury regulations, with reasoning that would extend to most if not all
Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents.8 The Florida
Bankers decision thus sends judicial review of Treasury Department
(“Treasury”) regulations and Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) guidance
documents interpreting the IRC down a different path than the rest of
administrative law.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Florida Bankers not only places AIA
interpretation at odds with Abbott Labs and the general administrative
law norm in favor of pre-enforcement judicial review of final agency
action. Florida Bankers also arguably contradicts the Supreme Court’s
reading in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl9 of the similarly worded Tax
Injunction Act (“TIA”) concerning judicial review of state tax matters.10
A more recent federal district court decision in Chamber of Commerce v.
IRS cites Direct Marketing in concluding that the AIA does not bar pre4
See, e.g., Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670–72 (1986)
(discussing the importance of judicial review to the legitimacy of administrative action);
Levin, supra note 2, at 742 (acknowledging standard justifications for pre-enforcement
review); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 Admin. L. Rev.
567, 597 (1992) (“The proposition that judicial review will generally be available to secure
the legitimacy of agency action is a central component of the traditional model of
administrative law.”).
5
562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
6
See, e.g., Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. at 672–73 (“Subject to
constitutional constraints, Congress can, of course, make exceptions to the historic practice
whereby courts review agency action.”).
7
I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
8
799 F.3d 1065, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
9
135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015).
10
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
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enforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations and sets up the
possibility of a circuit split.11 Meanwhile, the dueling Florida Bankers
majority and dissenting opinions and Chamber of Commerce decision
together underscore the courts’ ad hoc and inconsistent efforts to
interpret and apply the AIA in cases challenging Treasury and IRS
actions. To be blunt, the courts lack an overarching theory of the AIA’s
meaning and scope against which to evaluate individual tax cases, and
the result is jurisprudential chaos.
Developing a coherent understanding of the AIA’s meaning and
scope is important, especially regarding pre-enforcement judicial review
of APA challenges against Treasury regulations and IRS guidance
documents. Treasury and the IRS have not been faithful adherents to the
requirements of the APA.12 In the aftermath of Mayo Foundation, APAbased court challenges to Treasury regulations and IRS guidance
documents are on the rise.13 As was the case for the regulations at issue
in Florida Bankers, many of those complaints do not fall neatly into
traditional, post-enforcement avenues for judicial review of tax cases—
leaving many regulations and guidance documents effectively
unreviewable.14 Even where judicial review through traditional avenues
is potentially available, however, the resulting delay significantly limits
the courts’ ability to provide a meaningful remedy.15
Recent judicial treatments of both the AIA and the TIA have focused
almost exclusively on shallow parsings of isolated phrases of current
11
Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944-LY, 2017 WL 4682049 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2017).
12
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack
of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1727 (2007); Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
and IRS Regulations, 136 Tax Notes 271, 274–75 (2012).
13
See Kristin E. Hickman, Administrative Law’s Growing Influence on U.S. Tax
Administration, 3 J. Tax Admin. 82 (2017) (surveying strands of post–Mayo Foundation
jurisprudence).
14
See Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 Duke L.J. 1717,
1746–53 (2014) [hereinafter Hickman, Tax System We Have] (documenting that a
substantial percentage of Treasury regulations address social welfare and regulatory issues
unlikely to be reflected in the sort of tax filings that traditionally lead to judicial review);
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance
with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1153,
1181–200 (2008) [hereinafter Hickman, A Problem of Remedy] (discussing traditional
avenues for pursuing and barriers to judicial review of Treasury regulations).
15
Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 14, at 1181–200.
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statutory text and cherry-picked support from the Supreme Court’s
haphazard AIA jurisprudence, with only superficial attention paid to the
AIA’s long history, its interactive relationship with the IRC’s other
administrative provisions, or its role in the larger context of tax
administration.16 In particular, contemporary debates regarding the
AIA’s meaning fail to recognize that the AIA is not a modern
congressional enactment but rather dates back to the Civil War era—
long before the adoption of the modern income tax or the APA, and even
before the emergence of the modern regulatory state.17 Understanding
the AIA requires appreciating not only how it relates to contemporary
IRC provisions and tax administration practices, but also how those
provisions and practices have evolved since the AIA was adopted in
1867. A comprehensive analysis of the AIA in context over time reveals
a substantially narrower limitation on judicial review than at least the
Florida Bankers court was willing to accept.
Our goal with this Article is not wholly descriptive. As history
demonstrates, the AIA plays a critical role in efficient administration of
the tax laws. We also believe, however, that the tax system is best served
by hewing more closely to general administrative law norms.
Correspondingly, we perceive judicial review as an important check
against agency arbitrariness and contend that sheltering Treasury
regulations and IRS guidance documents from judicial scrutiny simply
encourages the IRS in its casual disregard for those general
administrative law norms. The IRS’s noncompliance with the law
undermines public perceptions of the tax system and tax administration
as fair and legitimate, which in turn discourages compliance with the tax
laws and diminishes the fisc. At a minimum, a better understanding of
the AIA is needed to ascertain whether the remedy to the question of
pre-enforcement review must be legislative or could be judicial.
To that end, Part I of this Article elaborates the jurisprudential muddle
surrounding the interpretation of the AIA and the increasing significance
of the conflict in light of the D.C. Circuit’s Florida Bankers decision. To
provide context for better understanding the AIA, Part II turns to the
provision’s history as it relates to tax administration more generally,
from its Civil War–era origins to the present. Part III draws upon that
16

See infra Section I.A.
Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471, 475 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 7421 (2012)).
17
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history to offer a more comprehensive theory for when courts should
read the AIA as limiting judicial review and, perhaps more importantly,
when they should not. Given the AIA’s history, however, legislation to
clarify the AIA’s scope may be warranted and is proposed.
I. A JURISPRUDENTIAL MESS, AND WHY IT MATTERS
The AIA mandates that, except as otherwise provided by the IRC, “no
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court.”18 The AIA itself lists several
exceptions including, for example, for deficiency actions, where the IRS
seeks to enforce the tax laws by issuing a notice of deficiency that the
taxpayer can then challenge in the U.S. Tax Court (“Tax Court”);19 for
premature IRS adjustments of partnership return items;20 and for certain
cases concerning IRS efforts to impose a levy on the taxpayer’s
property, where the IRC imposes additional procedures and limitations
that the IRS must satisfy.21 I.R.C. § 7422 contains another exception for
refund actions, where the taxpayer pays the disputed taxes and sues the
IRS for a refund.22 I.R.C. § 7428 provides yet another exception for
controversies concerning IRS exempt status determinations (or failure to
make certain exempt status determinations).23
Parsing the AIA’s core text carefully, four words are key: restraining,
assessment, collection, and tax. The last three of these terms—

18

I.R.C. § 7421(a).
Id. (cross-referencing §§ 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), and 6213(a), all of which are among
the provisions concerning the issuance of deficiency notices and Tax Court review thereof);
see also Gerald A. Kafka & Rita A. Cavanagh, Litigation of Federal Civil Tax Controversies
¶ 1.01 (2d ed. 1997) (recognizing deficiency actions as one of two principal types of tax
litigation, refund actions being the other).
20
I.R.C. § 7421(a) (cross-referencing §§ 6225(b) and 6246(b)). The Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584, amended the partnership audit and assessment
provisions and replaced these cross-references with a single cross-reference to § 6232(c),
effective January 1, 2018. Nevertheless, the substance of this exception from the AIA
appears unchanged by the amendment.
21
I.R.C. § 7421(a) (cross-referencing §§ 6330(e)(1), 6331(i), 6672(c), 7426(a) and (b)(1),
and 7429(b), all of which concern levy actions).
22
Id. § 7422(a); see also Kafka & Cavanagh, supra note 19, at ¶ 1.01 (recognizing refund
actions as one of two principal types of tax litigation, deficiency actions being the other).
23
Id. § 7428(a). The Declaratory Judgment Act recognizes this same exception. See 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
19
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assessment, collection, and tax—are easy enough to understand.
Restraining is much less so.
Assessment and collection are statutorily defined processes performed
by IRS personnel in accordance with extensive procedures contained
within the IRC. Chapter 63 of the IRC is entitled “Assessment.” It
describes an assessment as “made by recording the liability of the
taxpayer in the office of the [Treasury] Secretary in accordance with
rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary”24 and contains several
detailed
provisions
governing
the
assessment
function.25
Correspondingly, Chapter 64 of the IRC, entitled “Collection,”
authorizes the IRS to “collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue
laws”26 and includes several provisions governing the collection
function.27
In theory, not every remittance to the IRS contemplated by the IRC
neatly fits the most obvious conception of what constitutes a tax. The
Supreme Court has said that penalties are not taxes, for example.28 Yet
the courts have generally defined a tax for AIA purposes quite broadly,
at times so much so as to include remittances with characteristics that
arguably resemble penalties and interest.29
Courts have struggled a bit more to settle the meaning of restraining.
Does restraining the assessment and collection of taxes mean to stop
them outright only when they are temporally imminent? Or does
restraining extend to any action that merely makes those functions more
challenging to accomplish at some future time?30 Is there some

24

I.R.C. § 6203. In this, the IRS serves as the Treasury Secretary’s delegee.
Id. §§ 6201–6255.
26
Id. § 6301. Again, in this, the IRS serves as the Treasury Secretary’s delegee.
27
Id. §§ 6301–6344.
28
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543–46 (2012)
(concluding that shared responsibility payments to be collected by the IRS are not taxes for
AIA purposes because the IRC labels them penalties); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561–
62 (1922) (holding the AIA inapplicable because the assessment at issue was in the nature of
a penalty); see also infra Section II.D (elaborating these cases as regards this issue).
29
See infra Section II.D (discussing the distinction between penalties and taxes at greater
length).
30
See, e.g., California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a
challenge to information reports about pension funds falls under the AIA because such
reports would aid the IRS in determining tax liability in the future).
25
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principled midpoint between those two interpretations?31 Many Supreme
Court and federal circuit court cases grapple with these interpretive
questions, even if their reasoning is not always framed in such explicitly
textual terms as defining restraining. How courts answer these questions,
however, determines whether the AIA precludes judicial review of
virtually all tax cases except those expressly authorized by the IRC itself
or, alternatively, whether the AIA only covers a subset of tax cases
which the various exceptions then limit further.
Courts applying the AIA have not resolved these questions
consistently. The fragmented and inconsistent character of AIA
jurisprudence, while sometimes frustrating, has not been hugely
problematic until recently. The sweeping reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion in Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Department of the Treasury
puts AIA interpretation directly in conflict with Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner and Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl. Further, Florida Bankers
would shield many Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents
from judicial review altogether.
In short, cases interpreting the AIA have created a convoluted mess.
Meanwhile, tax administrative practices and changes in how Congress
utilizes the tax system have elevated the impact of how courts interpret
the AIA. This Part lays out the troubled state of AIA jurisprudence and
then explains why clarifying the AIA’s scope is important.
A. Exploring the Doctrinal Tensions
Understanding the AIA’s jurisprudential morass requires appreciating
three separate strands of case law relevant to AIA interpretation. The
first, obviously, consists of cases interpreting and applying the AIA
itself. But the AIA does not exist in a vacuum. One must also appreciate
the larger administrative law context of which judicial review of tax
cases is a part. Additionally, because the courts have linked the AIA and
the TIA so closely, cases concerning the TIA are relevant to thinking
about the AIA as well.

31
Compare Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1133 (2015), with Fla. Bankers
Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1069–70 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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1. Confused Anti-Injunction Act Jurisprudence
AIA cases from the past several decades reflect an interesting
combination of mostly questionable and even frivolous legal claims
resolved with little legal analysis, punctuated by the occasional truly
unusual dispute. Most of the more substantial opinions analyzing the
AIA fall within the latter group. Yet because the circumstances of those
cases are so unique and readily distinguishable from one another, the
inconsistencies in the courts’ reasoning from one to the next have been
relatively benign up to now.
Most AIA cases involve a rather typical, if colorful, assortment of tax
scofflaws. Tax protesters—often filing pro se and forever tilting at
windmills32—bring frivolous suits to avoid wage withholding and
government tax collection efforts based on claims long rejected by the
IRS and the courts. They claim, for example, that wages are not
income33 or that the litigants are exempt from federal taxation because
they are sovereign citizens of a particular state rather than citizens of the
United States.34 Another subset of typical litigants asserts obscure
technicalities to avoid IRS collection of taxes clearly owed.35 In one
such case, for example, after a taxpayer sent the IRS a check for
$179,501, but an IRS recording error caused the bank to pay only
$179.50, the taxpayer sought to enjoin collection of the remaining taxes
32
See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax
Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 819, 919–22 (2002)
(documenting increased tax protester activity and tax protester motivations and claims).
33
See, e.g., Taliaferro v. United States, 677 F. App’x 536 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam);
Capps v. Eggers, 782 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1986); Hansen v. United States, 744 F.2d 658 (8th
Cir. 1984).
34
See, e.g., Lewis v. BNSF Ry. Co., 671 F. App’x 386, 386 (7th Cir. 2016) (challenging
wage withholding and a levy for back taxes based on the taxpayer’s self-identification as an
“indigenous inhabitant traveler” and “One of We the People”); Stites v. U.S. Gov’t, 746 F.2d
1085, 1085–86 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (claiming exemption from taxation as “free,
soverign [sic], and natural citizen(s)”); Betz v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 286, 294–95 (1998)
(claiming citizenship of Washington State rather than the United States).
35
See, e.g., Weiler v. United States, No. 94-56465, 1996 WL 169254, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr.
10, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (finding record “replete with evidence” that the IRS’s
assessments were valid and declining to consider taxpayers’ suit to quiet title against tax
liens); Nuttle v. IRS, No. 95-2089, 1995 WL 643106, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995)
(unpublished table decision) (declining to enjoin collection of taxes recognized as due by the
Tax Court so that the taxpayer could avoid posting an appeal bond); Knight v. United States,
No. 93-35039, 1993 WL 140589, at *2 (9th Cir. May 4, 1993) (unpublished table decision)
(refusing to enjoin collection for lack of a deficiency notice where the Internal Revenue
Code did not require notice).
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owed based on the IRS’s “gross negligence.”36 In another case, the
taxpayer voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement with the IRS,
but when the IRS began collections under that agreement, the taxpayer
sought an injunction on the ground that the IRS also should have sent
him a formal notice of deficiency.37 In still another case, taxpayers who
did not prepare or file tax returns claimed deficiency notices issued to
them by the IRS were invalid because the IRS had not first prepared tax
returns on their behalf.38
A second, overlapping subset of AIA cases concerns taxpayers
claiming the courts should overlook the AIA in their particular
circumstances. In 1962, the Supreme Court attempted something of a
reset of its AIA jurisprudence in Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Navigation Co.39 The case concerned an effort to avoid the collection of
past-due payroll taxes which the taxpayer contended had been assessed
contrary to the law and would, if collected, throw it into bankruptcy.40
Somewhat ironically, the IRS had been willing to go along with a
preliminary injunction restraining collection but objected to permanent
injunctive relief.41 The court below had applied then-existing Court
precedent regarding the AIA’s scope to conclude that the AIA did not
apply. While not precisely disavowing its earlier decisions, the Supreme
Court reinterpreted the AIA quite broadly, holding that a taxpayer might
avoid the AIA only if “under no circumstances could the Government
ultimately prevail” and if “the taxpayer would suffer irreparable injury if
collection were effected.”42 In the case at bar, notwithstanding that
collection would bankrupt the taxpayer, the government’s liability
assessment was not obviously meritless, so the Court found jurisdiction
barred.
In the more than fifty years since deciding Williams Packing, the
Supreme Court has yet to find a case that satisfies its two-part test.
Claims of justiciability under Williams Packing have been only
36

Zarra v. United States, 254 F. App’x 931, 933 (3d Cir. 2007).
Flynn v. United States, 786 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1986).
38
Roat v. Comm’r, 847 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1988).
39
370 U.S. 1 (1962); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 742 (1974)
(characterizing Williams Packing thusly).
40
Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 4–5.
41
Id. at 2.
42
Id. at 7.
37
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marginally more successful in the lower courts.43 Many litigants assert
the egregiousness of the IRS’s actions in their particular cases. But, of
course, the IRS’s litigating positions typically are at least colorable.
Correspondingly, many litigants claim the hardships they will face if
forced to pay their taxes are especially unique and distinguishable from
those of other taxpayers against whom the courts have invoked the AIA.
Again, such is rarely the case.
In short, as has been true for at least the past several decades, most of
the cases in which a contemporary court considers whether the AIA
poses an obstacle to judicial review are easy ones. They arise in the
context of IRS enforcement efforts, as the IRS is auditing or making
inquiries about a particular taxpayer’s facts and circumstances or trying
to collect taxes already assessed. The taxpayers in these cases simply
cannot demonstrate that the IRS’s actions are so questionable or that
their circumstances are so unique to fall under the Williams Packing
exception. More often than not, even without the AIA, these taxpayers
would lose on the merits anyway. Unsurprisingly, courts with crowded
dockets have seized upon the AIA as a convenient and straightforward
rationale for disposing of such suits. The analysis of the AIA offered in
these cases, however, is often minimal. Unpublished opinions are
common.
By comparison with the lower courts, for at least the fifty-five years
since Williams Packing, the Supreme Court’s own AIA jurisprudence is
notable for two reasons. First, and perhaps not surprisingly given the
Court’s limited docket, the cases in which the Court has considered the
AIA’s meaning and scope are all highly unique. Second, the Court’s
analysis in these cases is highly variable. It is often said that hard cases
make bad law. The Court’s AIA decisions over the past half century fit
that maxim.

43
Although not precisely systematic, a review of roughly 100 federal circuit court
decisions applying the Williams Packing exception found only three in which the reviewing
court claimed jurisdiction to consider the merits. See Estate of Michael v. Lullo, 173 F.3d
503, 505, 512–13 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding jurisdiction notwithstanding the APA where the
IRS illegally denied credit to compensate for its own calculation error discovered after the
limitations period for adjusting the assessment had expired); Lampert v. United States, No.
87-2421, 1989 WL 104459, at *1–3 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1989) (finding jurisdiction where
assessed penalty was both very large and obviously miscalculated); Ponchik v. Comm’r, 854
F.2d 1127, 1130–32 (8th Cir. 1988) (allowing case to proceed where IRS audit file clearly
showed IRS error in the case of a federal prisoner trying to support a minor child).
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Some of the Court’s AIA cases in recent decades show the Court
adopting an extremely broad interpretation of the AIA as precluding
judicial review of virtually any case having to do with the federal tax
laws. In Bob Jones University v. Simon, for example, the Court
concluded that the AIA precluded judicial review of an IRS decision to
revoke a university’s tax-exempt status due to its racially discriminatory
admissions practices.44 In a companion case decided the same day,
Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., the Court reached the same
conclusion regarding an IRS decision to revoke a nonprofit
organization’s tax-exempt status due to its engaging in prohibited
lobbying activities.45 Revoking an organization’s exempt status will
eventually increase tax collections, as the organization will henceforth
be required to pay income taxes and contributors to that organization
will not be able to deduct their contributions. But the act of revoking an
organization’s exempt status is not, in and of itself, a determination of
taxes due.
In Bob Jones, the Court recognized that its past AIA jurisprudence
had been mixed—interpreting the AIA broadly as a limit to judicial
review but subject to frequent judicial exceptions.46 The Court then
characterized its opinion in Williams Packing, with its limited two-part
test for avoiding the AIA, as “spell[ing] an end to a cyclical pattern of
[judicial] allegiance to the plain meaning of the [AIA], followed by
periods of uncertainty caused by a judicial departure from that meaning,
and followed in turn by the Court’s rediscovery of the [AIA’s]
purpose.”47 In both Bob Jones and Americans United, in addressing the
litigants’ claims that suits over their exempt status did not directly and
immediately restrain the assessment or collection of taxes, the Court said
it was enough that the revocations would in the future deny tax
deductions to the organizations’ donors.48 In other words, because future
donors to the organizations would not be able to claim related tax
deductions and would thus pay more taxes themselves, the

44

416 U.S. 725 (1974).
416 U.S. 752 (1974).
46
416 U.S. at 742–45.
47
Id. at 742.
48
Id. at 740; Ams. United, 416 U.S. at 760–61.
45
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organizations’ suits to overturn the revocation of their exempt status in
turn restrained the collection of taxes and were barred by the AIA.49
Shortly after the Court decided Bob Jones and Americans United,
Congress amended the AIA and the Declaratory Judgment Act to allow
judicial review of exempt status determinations and revocations,
signaling its view that the Court resolved those cases incorrectly.50
Nevertheless, the Court continued to advance the reasoning of those
cases in other AIA decisions. In United States v. American Friends
Service Committee, the Court issued a per curiam opinion citing the AIA
and Bob Jones as barring a suit by anti-war protesters who claimed that
requiring their employers to withhold taxes from their wages violated
their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.51 More than
thirty years later, in United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., the
Court cited Americans United in holding that the AIA barred judicial
consideration of a taxpayer’s Tucker Act claim to a refund of taxes.52
Seemingly satisfying the requirements for invoking the Williams
Packing exception, the IRS in Clintwood Elkhorn Mining admitted to
collecting the taxes unconstitutionally.53 The taxpayer fell outside the
IRC’s deadline to file for a refund, and the Tucker Act offered a longer
limitations period.54 The Court nevertheless invoked the AIA and
dismissed the lawsuit rather than evaluate the taxpayer’s Tucker Act
claim.55
Despite its cautionary rhetoric in Bob Jones, the Court has created
additional judicial exceptions from the AIA anyway—several times.
One example comes from a pair of cases in 1976 concerning jeopardy
assessments.56 In Laing v. United States, the Court considered the case

49
Ams. United, 416 U.S. at 760–61 (“The obvious purpose of respondent’s action was to
restore advance assurance that donations to it would qualify as charitable deductions . . . that
would reduce the level of taxes of its donors.”).
50
See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1306, 90 Stat. 1520, 1717 (adopting
I.R.C. § 7428(a) and corresponding cross-references in the AIA and the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012)).
51
419 U.S. 7, 11–12 (1974) (per curiam).
52
553 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2008).
53
Id. at 5–6.
54
Id. at 6.
55
Id. at 10.
56
See I.R.C. § 6861(a) (2012) (authorizing immediate assessment and collection of a
deficiency if the IRS believes such “will be jeopardized by delay”); see also Laing v. United
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of a New Zealand citizen who was caught by customs officials taking
more than $300,000 in U.S. currency out of the country.57 The IRS
interpreted the IRC as allowing it to assess a tax deficiency and seize the
funds without first issuing a deficiency notice.58 The Court disagreed
and also held that the IRS’s noncompliance with its own procedures
exempted the case from the AIA.59 Shortly thereafter, in Commissioner
v. Shapiro, the Court considered a case in which the IRS assessed a
deficiency and seized assets belonging to a taxpayer who three days later
was extradited to Israel on criminal charges, thereby subjecting the
taxpayer to incarceration by taking the funds he otherwise would have
used to make bail.60 The Court had said in Americans United that the
AIA precluded judicial review even of constitutional issues.61
Nevertheless, the Shapiro Court said that the Due Process Clause
required the IRS to establish a factual basis (beyond a “mere good-faith
allegation”) for its assertions of taxes owed and held correspondingly
that the AIA did not apply to cut off the taxpayer’s suit.62
A few years after Laing and Shapiro, in South Carolina v. Regan, the
Court created another exception from the AIA.63 That case involved a
suit by South Carolina over amendments to the tax laws limiting the
statutory exemption from gross income for interest received on certain
state bond issuances.64 The State argued both that the amendments were
unconstitutional and that complying with them would adversely impact
its ability to price and sell its bonds.65 Again, the Americans United
Court had said that constitutional claims were not exempt from the AIA,
and the Court in that case also had considered the inadequacy of a
refund suit as a remedy more or less irrelevant for AIA purposes.66
Nevertheless, in South Carolina v. Regan, the Court placed great
States, 423 U.S. 161, 169–73 (1976) (documenting some of the history of jeopardy
assessments).
57
423 U.S. at 164–65.
58
Id. at 165.
59
Id. at 183–84.
60
424 U.S. 614, 619–20 (1976).
61
416 U.S. at 759.
62
424 U.S. at 628–30.
63
465 U.S. 367 (1984).
64
Id. at 370–71.
65
Id. at 370–72.
66
416 U.S. at 759, 762.
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emphasis on the State’s inability to comply with the law and sue for a
refund, holding that the AIA does not preclude pre-enforcement judicial
review where no other legal remedy is available—reasoning the Court
more or less had rejected in Bob Jones.67
Most recently, in National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) v. Sebelius, the Court held that the AIA did not prevent it from
considering the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s “shared
responsibility payment,” which is assessed and collected by the IRS like
a tax but labeled statutorily as a penalty.68 The circuits had divided over
this question. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits reached conclusions similar to
that of the Court—that the shared responsibility payments were not taxes
and thus not within the AIA’s scope.69 By contrast, citing past Court
precedent interpreting the AIA, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that any
“exaction for the support of the government” qualifies as a tax, even if it
“raises ‘obviously negligible’ revenue and furthers a revenue purpose
‘secondary’ to the primary goal of regulation,” so the AIA precluded
judicial review of the shared responsibility payment’s constitutionality.70
In agreeing with the Sixth and D.C. Circuits regarding the applicability
of the AIA to the shared responsibility payment, however, the Court
neither distinguished the circumstances at bar from those of previous
AIA cases treating penalties as taxes nor invoked one of its established
exceptions. Instead, the Court completely ignored its existing AIA
precedents and focused exclusively on the text of various provisions of
the IRC.71
From this survey of the Supreme Court’s AIA jurisprudence, it seems
clear that the Court lacks any overarching theory regarding the AIA’s
meaning and scope, with the result that its decisions over the past fifty
years seem very result oriented. And, given the Court’s fragmented and
inconsistent guidance, it is perhaps not too surprising that federal circuit
67

South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. at 373, 378, 380–81.
567 U.S. 519, 543–46 (2012); see also I.R.C. § 5000A(b), (g) (imposing the penalty,
though describing those against whom the penalty is assessed as “taxpayer[s]” and calling
for the penalty to be “assessed and collected in the same manner as” penalties that are
administered like taxes).
69
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 540 (6th Cir. 2011).
70
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 401–02 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936), and United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950)).
71
NFIB, 567 U.S. at 543–46.
68
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court opinions are muddled as well regarding the reviewability of preenforcement claims that Treasury regulations and IRS guidance
documents are invalid under the APA.
Before the Supreme Court’s embrace of general administrative law
applicability in the tax context in the Mayo Foundation for Medical
Education & Research v. United States decision, jurisprudence on that
question was limited. In 1981, in California v. Regan, the Ninth Circuit
considered a challenge to a regulation interpreting the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) as requiring the State of
California to file annual information returns concerning its employees’
pension plan.72 Observing that such reports would provide the IRS with
data that, in turn, would enable the IRS to evaluate the eligibility of plan
beneficiaries for favorable tax treatment and, thus, would “have an
impact on the assessment of federal taxes,” the court concluded that the
AIA precluded judicial review of the regulation.73
Several years later, in Foodservice & Lodging Institute v. Regan in
1987, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the AIA permitted judicial review
of one regulation but precluded consideration of three others governing
how restaurant employers allocate and report tip income among
employees.74 The reviewable regulation concerned a statutory
requirement that employers report the aggregate amounts of their gross
receipts, receipts paid by credit card, and tips listed on the credit card
slips.75 According to the court, “On its face, the regulation does not
relate to the assessment or collection of taxes, but to IRS efforts to
determine the extent of tip compliance in the food and beverage
industry.”76 Consequently, notwithstanding that the purpose of
collecting such information was to facilitate IRS efforts to assess and
collect taxes on tip income, the court said that the AIA did not preclude
pre-enforcement review of that regulation.77 Of the three unreviewable
regulations, the first addressed which employees’ tips should be
allocated; the second defined “employee” for determining when an
establishment employed “more than ten employees” and, thus, was
72

641 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 722–23.
74
809 F.2d 842, 843–44, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
75
Id. at 845–46.
76
Id. at 846.
77
Id.
73
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subject to the statutory and regulatory requirements regarding tip
allocation and reporting; and the third regulation prioritized withholding
of federal taxes from an employee’s tips over other claims to that
income.78 Observing that those regulations “plainly concern[ed] the
assessment or collection of federal taxes” of employees, the court held
the AIA precluded pre-enforcement judicial review of the regulations’
validity.79
Since the Supreme Court decided the Mayo Foundation case, the
federal circuit courts have had several opportunities to consider the
relationship between the AIA and the APA’s judicial review provisions.
The results, again, have been decidedly mixed.
One key case was Cohen v. United States, which concerned a unique
mechanism created by the IRS to refund a telephone excise tax made
defunct by changes in telephone technology and long-distance billing
practices.80 The excise tax had been collected from consumers by
telephone companies as part of their routine billing process, then
remitted by the telephone companies to the IRS.81 After several federal
circuit courts rejected the IRS’s arguments for continuing to collect the
tax,82 the IRS adopted special refund procedures for the tax by issuing an
informal guidance document—Notice 2006-50—without using APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.83 Taxpayers who believed
that the IRS’s special refund procedures were inadequate challenged
Notice 2006-50, claiming that the IRS should have used notice-andcomment rulemaking to identify flaws and fashion a better special
refund process.84
The en banc D.C. Circuit held that the Cohen taxpayers could bring
their APA claim against Notice 2006-50. The en banc court said that,
because the taxes at issue had already been paid, a challenge to the

78

Id. at 843–44.
Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
80
650 F.3d 717, 719–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
81
See id. at 719–20 (summarizing the history of the tax); see also I.R.C. §§ 4251–4254
(imposing the tax).
82
See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 431 F.3d 374, 374, 379 (D.C. Cir.
2005); OfficeMax v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2005); Am. Bankers Ins.
Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2005).
83
See I.R.S. Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141.
84
Cohen, 650 F.3d at 721.
79
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refund mechanism would not restrain assessment or collection.85
Speaking more broadly, however, the court also reasoned that the AIA’s
prohibition against suits that restrain the “assessment or collection of
any tax” is not “synonymous with the entire plan of taxation.”86 Instead,
noted the court, “assessment” and “collection” are defined terms in the
IRC: assessment represents “the trigger for levy and collection efforts,”
and collection is “the actual imposition of tax against a plaintiff.”87 The
Cohen appellants’ APA procedural claim did not concern the assessment
or collection of taxes, the court said, because “[t]he IRS previously
assessed and collected the excise tax at issue”; their suit was instead
merely about the procedures by which the IRS would refund taxes that it
has already collected.88 The mere fact that the case concerned taxes was
insufficient for the AIA to apply, and claims to the contrary “neglect[]
the nuance.”89
According to the Cohen court, the AIA “requires a careful inquiry
into the remedy sought, the statutory basis for that remedy, and any
implication the remedy may have on assessment and collection.”90
Although a dissenting opinion authored by Judge Brett Kavanaugh
contended that statutory refund actions authorized by I.R.C. § 7422
offered the appellants an appropriate legal remedy,91 the majority
disagreed. Specifically, the majority observed that the taxpayers’ APA
challenge sought equitable relief in the form of additional administrative
procedures, rather than a tax refund (even if a refund was their ultimate
goal), and I.R.C. § 7422 does not offer that remedy.92
As already noted, the circuits divided over whether the AIA precluded
judicial review of constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s
shared responsibility payments, culminating in the Supreme Court’s
decision in NFIB.93 The D.C. Circuit, for one, concluded in Seven-Sky v.
Holder that the AIA did not apply in part because the shared
85

Id. at 725.
Id. at 726–27.
87
Id. at 726.
88
Id. at 725–26.
89
Id. at 726.
90
Id. at 727.
91
See id. at 738–41 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
92
See id. at 731–32 (majority opinion).
93
See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing the circuit split in general
terms).
86
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responsibility payment was a penalty rather than a tax.94 The court also
separately determined that the AIA does not apply to regulatory
requirements because the plaintiffs claimed an injury independent of
incurring taxes and irrespective of whether an assessable penalty ever
becomes assessed.95 As in Cohen, however, Judge Kavanaugh dissented,
claiming that the AIA denied the court jurisdiction over the case because
the IRC equates penalties and taxes when speaking of assessment and
collection. “In short,” he said, the court “cannot avoid the [AIA] either
by characterizing plaintiffs’ complaint as a challenge to the mandate and
not to the tax penalty, or by characterizing the Government’s goal as
regulating the decision to buy health insurance rather than as raising
revenue.”96
Just a few years later, in Florida Bankers, yet another divided D.C.
Circuit panel held that the AIA blocked a lawsuit challenging third-party
reporting by banks regarding interest income earned by their non-U.S.
customers.97 The interest income in question is not taxable in the United
States.98 Rather, the government wants the information covered by the
regulation to trade with foreign governments in exchange for
information regarding interest earned by U.S. citizens and residents
abroad.99 Nevertheless, violating the reporting requirements carries civil
penalties assessed and collected like taxes under the IRC.100 Judge
Kavanaugh—this time writing for the panel’s majority rather than
dissenting—said that enjoining the regulation would mean that no one
could be found to violate it and, therefore, the penalty for violating the
regulation would never be assessed or collected.101 Pointing to one
sentence in I.R.C. § 6671 that would treat the penalty like a tax, Judge
Kavanaugh held that a straightforward reading of the AIA would

94

588.
95

661 F.3d 1, 8–10 (D.C. Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by NFIB, 567 U.S. at

Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 9–10.
Id. at 45 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction).
97
799 F.3d at 1067.
98
I.R.C. § 871(i)(2)(A) (2012).
99
Guidance on Reporting Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, T.D. 9584, 77 Fed. Reg.
23,391 (Apr. 19, 2012), 2012-20 I.R.B. 900.
100
I.R.C. § 6721(a); see also Fla. Bankers, 799 F.3d at 1067 (discussing the penalty);
discussion infra Section II.D (discussing penalty types under the IRC).
101
Fla. Bankers, 799 F.3d at 1068.
96
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preclude the banks’ suit.102 He also rejected any distinction between
regulatory mandates or information reporting requirements and more
traditional tax obligations for AIA purposes.103
Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson dissented, arguing that the Florida
Bankers majority opinion was inconsistent with both Supreme Court and
other D.C. Circuit decisions, which she said exempted information
reporting requirements from the AIA.104 As Judge Henderson observed,
the plaintiffs in Florida Bankers were not ordinary taxpayers who could
simply pay their taxes and seek a refund from the IRS.105 Unlike actual
taxes, penalties imposed for failing to file information returns do not
become due at the end of a taxable year and are not assessed as a matter
of course.106 Only after a person violates a regulatory requirement will
assessment take place. Thus, absent pre-enforcement review, the Florida
Bankers plaintiffs, like those in Cohen, have no lawful means of
challenging the regulations at issue.107
Florida Bankers also arguably conflicts with the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Seven-Sky. In Seven-Sky, religious objectors claimed the
individual mandate imposed a nonmonetary injury to their religious
beliefs by forcing them to buy health insurance.108 Hence, the Seven-Sky
court said the AIA did not apply.109 Similarly, the banking association
plaintiffs in Florida Bankers claimed an injury separate from any
assessable penalties.110 Specifically, the banks alleged that the reporting
requirements would cause capital flight—i.e. the rapid withdrawal of
funds from banks—once foreign citizens learned that the interest
accrued on their U.S. bank accounts would be reported to the IRS and
eventually their home countries.111 Writing in concurrence in Florida

102

Id. at 1068–70 (finding the case “at the heartland of the Anti–Injunction Act”).
Id. at 1070–72.
104
Id. at 1072–73 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 1083–84.
106
Id.
107
Compare id. at 1083 (stating that the plaintiffs “cannot obtain judicial review of the
2012 Rule unless it refuses to submit a” tax form), with Cohen, 650 F.3d at 736 (holding that
“[b]ecause Appellants have no other adequate remedy at law,” the AIA does not apply).
108
661 F.3d at 8–9, abrogated on other grounds by NFIB, 567 U.S. at 541, 588.
109
661 F.3d at 10.
110
799 F.3d at 1078 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 1077–78.
103
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Bankers, however, Judge Raymond Randolph maintained that Judge
Henderson overread the court’s holding in Seven-Sky.112
In fairness to the Florida Bankers majority, the circumstances of the
precedents cited by Judge Henderson are distinguishable from those of
Florida Bankers, involving different taxes, different penalties, and
different types of taxpayers. The Cohen litigants, for example, had no
possible avenue for seeking judicial review, lawful or otherwise,
whereas in Florida Bankers, the plaintiffs could otherwise pursue
judicial review by violating the regulatory requirement. The individual
litigants in Seven-Sky were raising constitutional and religious freedom
challenges, whereas the plaintiff banks in Florida Bankers were
contesting an obscure paperwork burden. Nevertheless, Florida Bankers
and the D.C. Circuit’s other AIA precedents differ most in their very
different approaches toward interpreting and applying the AIA,
suggesting a more fundamental intracircuit disagreement regarding the
AIA’s meaning and scope that may have shifted along with personnel
changes on that court.
Finally, the Florida Bankers court’s position regarding penalties and
the AIA arguably places the D.C. Circuit in conflict with the Seventh
and Tenth Circuits.113 In litigation over whether Affordable Care Act
regulations requiring employers to provide contraceptive coverage
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the government did not
assert the AIA as a jurisdictional bar. Nevertheless, the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits raised the issue sua sponte, recognizing that the
regulations in question were enforceable through penalties contained in
the IRC that are assessed and collected like taxes.114 Again, the penalties
at issue in these cases were different from that in Florida Bankers.115
Regardless, both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits recognized the
contraceptive mandate as more regulatory than revenue raising, and the

112

Id. at 1072 (Randolph, J., concurring).
See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 669 (7th Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores v.
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1126–28 (10th Cir. 2013).
114
Korte, 735 F.3d at 669–70; Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1126–27.
115
Compare Korte, 735 F.3d at 669 (identifying the relevant penalty provision as in I.R.C.
§§ 4980D and 4980H), with Fla. Bankers, 799 F.3d at 1068 (discussing the penalty imposed
by I.R.C. § 6721(a), in a different subtitle of Title 26).
113
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penalties as incidental.116 Citing Cohen, both courts rejected the AIA’s
applicability in such circumstances.117
2. The Administrative Procedure Act’s Presumption of Reviewability
The assumptions and interpretations of the APA and general
administrative law doctrine are much different than those attributed to
the AIA. To foster compliance with APA requirements, courts generally
favor judicial review of final agency action on a pre-enforcement
timetable. In Abbott Labs, the Supreme Court recognized that the APA
“embodies [a] basic presumption of judicial review . . . so long as no
statute precludes such relief or the action is not one committed by law to
agency discretion.”118 Timely judicial review to ascertain the validity of
agency rules and regulations ensures that aggrieved persons have a fair
opportunity to make their case before they incur the costs of compliance
or risk penalties for noncompliance.119 Judicial review has been
instrumental in ensuring meaningful agency compliance with statutory
requirements. Pre-enforcement judicial review is thus believed to
enhance public perceptions regarding the fairness and legitimacy of
administrative action.
The APA rulemaking procedures mimic aspects of the legislative
process120 by requiring agencies to engage in public notice and comment
and by requiring a preamble to final regulations.121 Much like the
legislative process, the APA’s notice and comment requirements provide
an agency with “the facts and information relevant to a particular
administrative problem, as well as suggestions for alternative

116

Korte, 735 F.3d at 669–70; cf. Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1127 (“[T]he
corporations’ suit is not challenging the IRS’s ability to collect taxes. Rather, they seek to
enjoin the enforcement of one HHS regulation . . . that they claim violates their RFRA
rights.”).
117
Korte, 735 F.3d at 670 (quoting Cohen for the proposition that “the [AIA] does not
reach ‘all disputes tangentially related to taxes’”); Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1127
(same).
118
387 U.S. at 140.
119
Id. at 152–53.
120
See Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 14, at 1204 (suggesting that APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking, enforced by judicial review, represents “a second-best
proxy for the legislative process”).
121
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
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solutions,”122 and “reintroduce public participation and fairness to
affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to
unrepresentative agencies.”123
Recognizing these concerns, courts have interpreted the APA as
requiring a notice of proposed rulemaking issued by an agency to
include sufficient information about the data upon which the agency
relied in developing its proposed rules.124 This gives the public a fair
opportunity to address and potentially contradict that data.125 If an
agency changes its mind about a critical aspect of regulations it has
proposed, courts have interpreted the APA as requiring the agency to
issue an additional notice of proposed rulemaking and allow further
opportunity to comment.126 Without this requirement, agencies could
sidestep public participation by excluding controversial provisions from
an initial notice and later adding them to the final rule.127 Lastly, courts
have interpreted the APA as requiring agencies to respond to all
significant comments made by the public in the preamble to the final
rule.128 All of these requirements exist to ensure that the public has a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the development of binding
legal rules that will govern their behavior.
Beyond procedural requirements, courts have also interpreted the
APA as requiring agencies to adequately explain their regulatory choices
contemporaneously with their decision making. Section 706 of the APA
requires a reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law.”129 In Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual
122
Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 662
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
123
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
124
See, e.g., Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing the
function of the notice requirement).
125
See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236–40 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
126
See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750–52 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
127
Id. at 747 (“If the deviation from the proposal is too sharp, the affected parties will not
have had adequate notice and opportunity for comment.”).
128
Cf. Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that the agency must
“respond in a reasoned manner to the comments received, to explain how the agency
resolved any significant problems raised by the comments, and to show how that resolution
led the agency to the ultimate rule”).
129
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
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Automobile Insurance Co., the Supreme Court interpreted this arbitrary
and capricious standard as requiring agencies to offer contemporaneous
explanations in support of their actions.130 When deciding these “hard
look” cases,131 courts examine whether an agency considered all of the
relevant data, statutorily required factors, and policy alternatives and
whether the agency adequately justified its choices.132
Finally, through judicial review, courts ensure that agencies do not
exceed their statutory authority to adopt rules and regulations in the first
instance.133 Agency rules and regulations carrying the force and effect of
law are eligible for the Chevron standard of review. If a statute is
ambiguous, the administering agency has discretion in choosing between
reasonable alternative interpretations. Under the familiar two-step
Chevron framework, however, courts ask first whether the statute in
question is ambiguous and thus extends such interpretive discretion to
the administering agency. Where the statute confers such discretion,
Chevron’s second step asks further whether the agency’s interpretation
is among the reasonable alternatives.134 Empirical data shows that
agency rules and regulations more often than not pass Chevron muster,
but the standard nevertheless constrains agencies to that realm of
reasonability.135
Congress subjected the Treasury Department and IRS, like other
executive agencies, to the requirements of the APA.136 Without judicial
review, however, the good government principles embodied by the APA
are largely left to the IRS’s good intentions.
130

463 U.S. 29, 43–44, 57 (1983).
See, e.g., Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (referring
to the arbitrary and capricious standard as requiring the agency to take a “hard look” at the
relevant issues).
132
See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (describing the factors that courts should look to in
deciding arbitrary and capriciousness challenges).
133
Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
134
Id. at 842–43 (describing the two questions a court must ask when dealing with a
challenge to an agency’s chosen interpretation of a statute).
135
See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 28–31 (2017) (finding that federal circuit courts uphold agency interpretations in
seventy-one percent of cases overall and in seventy-seven percent of cases when the
Chevron standard is applied).
136
Cf. Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 55 (rejecting “an approach to administrative review good
for tax law only”).
131
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3. The Tax Injunction Act
And then we have the TIA. Passed by Congress in 1937,137 the TIA
states that “district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”138
Although the wording of the TIA is slightly different from that of the
AIA, Congress used the latter as a model for the former.139 The Supreme
Court has observed that the TIA “has its roots in equity practice, in
principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a
State to administer its own fiscal operations.”140 The legislative history
of the TIA sheds more light on Congress’s intent.
As with the AIA at the federal level, Congress’s main objective in
passing the TIA was to protect state revenue collection.141 Indeed, the
House Report on the TIA details a specific problem that Congress
intended the TIA to solve. Before the TIA came into existence, many
states maintained statutes prohibiting their own courts from entertaining
tax suits unless taxpayers paid their liabilities under protest and then
later sought a refund.142 These statutes did not, of course, have any effect
on federal courts. Problems arose when foreign corporations—those
domiciled out of state—invoked diversity jurisdiction in federal court to
challenge state tax liability.143 The House Report further notes that states
were choosing to settle these tax lawsuits with corporations rather than

137

Act of Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, 50 Stat. 738 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(2012)).
138
28 U.S.C. § 1341.
139
Compare I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (providing that “no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court”), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State.”).
140
Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73 (1976).
141
See H.R. Rep. No. 75-1503, at 1–2 (1937) (describing the circumstances justifying
passage of the TIA and the effects of that Act).
142
See id. at 2 (“[F]oreign corporations . . . withhold from [states] and their governmental
subdivisions, taxes in such vast amounts . . . as to seriously disrupt State and county
finances.”).
143
Id. (“The existing practice of the Federal courts in entertaining tax-injunction suits
against State officers makes it possible for foreign corporations . . . to withhold [taxes].”).
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litigating.144 As a result, corporations were able to use litigation or the
threat thereof to reduce their tax burdens, which in turn reduced state
revenue collection. Congress passed the TIA to close this federal court
loophole, protecting the revenue-raising ability of the states.145
In interpreting the TIA, the Supreme Court has taken a distinctly
textual approach. Specifically, in Direct Marketing, the Court held that
the terms contained within the TIA refer to distinct phases of the tax
administration process, and the Court determined the meaning of those
terms by referring to past and present provisions of the federal tax
laws.146 For instance, assessment means “the official recording of a
taxpayer’s liability” and “an official action taken based on information
already reported to the taxing authority.”147 Collection is “the act of
obtaining payment of taxes due.”148 And levy is “a specific mode of
collection under which the Secretary of the Treasury distrains and seizes
a recalcitrant taxpayer’s property.”149 Lawsuits then fall under the TIA
when a taxpayer seeks, via judicial review, to stop state officials from
taking those specific and discrete administrative steps listed—
assessment, collection, and levy.150 The facts of Direct Marketing
illustrate how this works.
At issue in Direct Marketing was a Colorado law requiring retailers
who do not collect sales taxes to inform customers directly about their
obligation to pay corresponding use taxes to the state.151 The state of
Colorado made a straightforward argument recognizable from some of
144

Id. (“The pressing needs of these States . . . is so great that in many instances they have
been compelled to compromise these suits, as a result of which substantial portions of the tax
have been lost . . . .”).
145
S. Rep. No. 75-1035, at 3 (1937) (stating that the TIA was needed because of “the
compelling needs of many States for a more prompt disposition of tax controversies of the
character referred to”).
146
135 S. Ct. 1124, 1129–30 (2015).
147
Id. at 1130 (citing § 1530 of the federal tax laws as of 1937, when the TIA was enacted,
and § 6203 of the present IRC, as well as § 277(a) of the Revenue Act of 1924).
148
Id. at 1129–31 (citing several provisions from the federal tax laws as of 1937 and
§ 6302 of the present IRC).
149
Id. at 1130 (citing §§ 1540, 1544, and 1582 of the federal tax laws as of 1937 and
§ 6331 of the present IRC).
150
Id. at 1132 (holding that “‘restrain’ acts on a carefully selected list of technical terms—
‘assessment, levy, collection’—not on an all-encompassing term, like ‘taxation,’” and
“‘restrain’ . . . captures only those orders that stop” those technical terms).
151
Id. at 1127.
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the AIA cases described above: if retailers were able to challenge this
statute in court, then the state would receive less tax revenue when
parties otherwise subject to use taxes were not apprised of their tax
obligations.152 The Court rejected this argument in an equally
straightforward fashion. The challenged law imposed notice and
reporting requirements, and the Court said that enforcing those
requirements was not “an act[] of assessment, levy, [or] collection.”153
Thus, according to the Court, although a lawsuit challenging notice and
reporting requirements might inhibit the assessment, levy, or collection
of taxes, it does not stop, and thus cannot be said to “restrain” those
acts.154
For the purposes of this Article, it is most important to note the close
relationship between the TIA and the AIA. From the very beginning of
the TIA, these two statutes have been closely linked. Introducing the
TIA during floor debates in the Senate, Senator Homer Bone explained
that the language of the TIA “is not novel in character” and then
proceeded to read the text of the AIA.155 As early as 1962, the Supreme
Court looked to the legislative history of the TIA to guide its analysis of
the AIA, observing that “[t]he enactment of the comparable Tax
Injunction Act of 1937 . . . throws light on the proper construction to be
given [the AIA].”156 Almost forty years later, the Court noted that
“Congress modeled the Tax Injunction Act . . . upon previously enacted
federal statutes of similar import” and that “[t]he federal statute
Congress had in plain view was” the AIA.157 In the Court’s most recent
TIA cases, Hibbs v. Winn and Direct Marketing, it again reiterated the
close relationship between these two statutes: “The TIA was modeled on
the anti-injunction provision; it incorporates the same terminology
employed by the provision; and it employs that terminology for the same

152
Id. at 1132–33 (describing the opinion of the court below as relying on an interpretation
of restrain that extends to any lawsuit merely inhibiting assessment, collection, or levy).
153
Id. at 1131 (“The TIA is keyed to the acts of assessment, levy, and collection
themselves, and enforcement of the notice and reporting requirements is none of these.”).
154
Id. at 1133 (“Applying the correct definition, a suit cannot be understood to ‘restrain’
the ‘assessment, levy or collection’ of a state tax if it merely inhibits those activities.”).
155
81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (statement of Sen. Bone).
156
Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 6.
157
Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing S. Rep. No. 75-1035, at 1 (1937)).
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purpose. It is sensible, then, to interpret the TIA’s terms by reference to
the [IRC’s] use of the term.”158
The Supreme Court is not the only branch of the federal government
to take this view. Participating as amicus curiae in Winn, the federal
government took the position that courts should interpret the AIA and
the TIA similarly. Winn concerned the proper definition of the word
“assessment.”159 In the statement of interest portion of its amicus brief,
the government explained that the United States “has a substantial
interest in the proper interpretation and application of these parallel
statutory provisions”—meaning the AIA and the TIA.160 In other words,
the government filed a brief in a TIA suit because it worried that any
resulting Court holding would directly implicate future interpretations of
the AIA. This same reasoning is present throughout the government’s
brief. The government argued that, “[i]n incorporating this same
terminology into the Tax Injunction Act, Congress presumably meant
the term ‘assessment’ to have the same meaning in both provisions [the
other being the AIA].”161 Later, the government again referred to the
TIA and AIA as “parallel statutory prohibitions against judicial
restraints on the assessment of taxes.”162
In sum, Congress created the TIA to protect state tax revenue
collection, just as it created the AIA to protect federal tax revenue
collection. The TIA shields the actions of state tax officials from judicial
review in federal courts when litigants seek to stop discrete steps in the
tax administration process—assessment, collection, levy.163 For many
years, the Supreme Court has taken the position that a close relationship
exists between the TIA and AIA, which justifies “interpret[ing] the
TIA’s terms by reference to the [AIA’s] use of the [same] term.”164 This
is a position adopted and advocated for by federal government litigators
158
Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 115 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also
Direct Mktg., 135 S. Ct. at 1129 (“Although the TIA does not concern federal taxes, it was
modeled on the Anti–Injunction Act (AIA), which does.”).
159
The case was a dispute about whether Arizona could offer tax credits to be used for
private religious education. See generally Winn, 542 U.S. at 92–94.
160
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1–2, Hibbs v.
Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (No. 02-1809).
161
Id. at 11.
162
Id. at 18.
163
See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
164
Winn, 542 U.S. at 115 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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during the George W. Bush administration.165 But lower federal courts
often have not interpreted the AIA in harmony with developments in the
Supreme Court’s TIA jurisprudence—creating yet another unresolved
tension in the AIA case law.
The Supreme Court with Direct Marketing and the D.C. Circuit with
Florida Bankers have put the TIA and the AIA on a collision course.
Specifically, the reasoning of Direct Marketing is different from and
difficult to square with at least some of the Court’s past AIA precedents.
For example, in both Bob Jones and Americans United, the Court held
that the AIA blocks pre-enforcement review of 501(c)(3) exempt status
determinations because enjoining the IRS from denying or revoking a
nonprofit’s charitable status would allow the nonprofit’s donors to
deduct their contributions, reducing their own tax liabilities, and thus
would stop the agency from collecting taxes.166 This rationale is not
consistent with the holding and reasoning of the Court in Direct
Marketing. Like the third-party reporting requirements at issue in Direct
Marketing, 501(c)(3) exempt status determinations are tangential to and
temporally remote from the eventual tax assessments and collections
associated with them.167 Based on the analysis of the Direct Marketing
decision, a challenge to a 501(c)(3) exempt status determination should
not fall under the AIA because it does not stop assessment and
collection.168 Yet, the Court in Bob Jones and Americans United
concluded otherwise.169
Similarly, recall that Florida Bankers, like Direct Marketing,
involved third-party reporting requirements, albeit with one key
difference: the IRS enforces the Florida Bankers requirements through
penalties.170 Focusing on language in the IRC equating taxes and

165
See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text (documenting the government’s
position as amicus in Winn).
166
Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 726–27, 749–50; Ams. United, 416 U.S. at 754–56, 760–63; see
also supra notes 44–55 (describing these cases at greater length and documenting others with
similar reasoning).
167
Frances R. Hill & Douglas M. Mancino, Taxation of Exempt Organizations ¶ 32.08
(2002).
168
Direct Mktg., 135 S. Ct. at 1132–33 (determining that “‘[r]estrain’ . . . captures only
those orders that stop (or perhaps compel) acts of ‘assessment, levy and collection’”).
169
See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text (describing the Bob Jones and
Americans United decisions).
170
Fla. Bankers, 799 F.3d at 1068–69.
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penalties for purposes of assessment and collection, the D.C. Circuit
panel majority reasoned that the AIA applied because a challenge to the
third-party reporting requirements would stop any penalty for
noncompliance from being assessed or collected. In other words,
because declining or otherwise failing to comply with Treasury’s
regulations can result in a penalty, invalidating a Treasury regulation
will eliminate the possibility that the IRS might someday assess and
collect those penalties.171 The penalty assessment contemplated in
Florida Bankers was at least one step removed from the regulatory
challenge at issue. Direct Marketing would require greater proximity to
the assessment or collection function.
B. Why the Conflict Matters
How the Supreme Court or the federal circuit courts go about
untangling the AIA mess carries real practical implications. Treasury
and the IRS do not have a great history of complying with APA
procedures, having claimed for several decades that their rules and
regulations are exempt from those requirements. At best, applying the
AIA to preclude pre-enforcement review of Treasury regulations and
IRS guidance documents delays judicial review for years or even
decades. As a practical matter, many rules and regulations will be
shielded from judicial review in perpetuity. In a world where the sole or
even primary function of Treasury and the IRS was restricted to raising
revenue for the federal government, and the federal government’s ability
to raise revenue truly rose and fell on Treasury’s ability to promulgate
regulations free from judicial review, this balance might be worth
striking. But the mission of Treasury and the IRS via the IRC is now
much broader than simply raising revenue. Treasury and the IRS are
now responsible for a variety of social welfare and regulatory functions
and programs that are largely indistinguishable from those of agencies
subject to pre-enforcement review.
1. A History of Loose Administrative Procedure Act Compliance
Understanding how Treasury and the IRS flout the APA requires a bit
more backstory. APA requirements apply to those regulations that are

171

Id. at 1069–70.
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considered to be “legislative.”172 Regulations are considered legislative
when they carry the “force and effect of law.”173 Generally speaking,
there are two kinds of Treasury regulations—specific authority and
general authority.174 Specific authority regulations are those passed
under grants of rulemaking authority contained in substantive provisions
of the IRC to fill congressionally identified statutory gaps.175 Most
Treasury regulations, however, are adopted under the general authority
provided by I.R.C. § 7805(a) to the Secretary of the Treasury to
“prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of” the
IRC.176
Both types of Treasury regulations carry the force of law, largely
(though perhaps not always exclusively) because taxpayers and tax
return preparers are subject to the same congressionally imposed
penalties for violating either specific or general regulations.177 In Mayo
Foundation, the Supreme Court confirmed that both types of Treasury
regulations carry the force of law for purposes of eligibility for Chevron
deference.178 Building upon that decision, the full Tax Court has
unanimously held that Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to
I.R.C. § 7805(a) are legislative rules for APA purposes.179
For several decades, however, the tax community separated specific
from general authority Treasury regulations by labeling the former as

172
United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers
Int’l Union v. Fed. Highway Admin., 151 F. Supp. 3d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Agencies need
not subject interpretive rules to Section 553’s notice and comment rulemaking
requirements.”).
173
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (quoting Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302–03 (1979)).
174
Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 56–58 (recognizing the distinction); Altera Corp. &
Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 114 (2015) (same); Kimberly S. Blanchard, NYSBA
Tax Section Comments on Legislative Grants of Regulatory Authority (Nov. 3, 2006),
reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Nov. 7, 2006, 2006 TNT 215–22 (LexisNexis) (same).
175
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1502 (2012).
176
Id. § 7805(a).
177
See, e.g., id. § 6662(a)–(b)(1), (c) (imposing penalties for failure to comply with “rules
or regulations”); id. § 6694(b) (same); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (1991) (defining
“rules or regulations”); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(e) (1991) (same).
178
562 U.S. at 56–58.
179
See Altera, 145 T.C. at 116–17.
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“legislative” and the latter as “interpretative” (i.e., nonlegislative).180
Based on this outdated labelling, Treasury and the IRS have maintained
for decades that most Treasury regulations are exempt from APA
procedural requirements as interpretative rules.181 Even after the
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Mayo Foundation that both specific
and general authority Treasury regulations carry the force of law, the
government has continued to assert that many or even most Treasury
regulations are exempt interpretative rules.182
Although Treasury has always purported to follow APA requirements
anyway in promulgating its regulations—and typically has appeared to
do so, in a fashion—legal scholars and commentators have complained
for decades about Treasury’s weak record of compliance with the APA
when it promulgates regulations. Twenty-five years ago, Professor
Michael Asimow pointed out that Treasury too often issued temporary
regulations without prepromulgation notice and comment and raised
concerns about noncompliance with the APA.183 One of us subsequently
documented empirically that Treasury fails to follow APA notice-and180

See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in
the Chevron Era, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 35, 44 (1995); Richard E. Levy & Robert L.
Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 499, 520–21 (2011); Irving Salem
et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 Tax
Law. 717, 728 (2004); Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary
Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative
Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 248, 249–50
(2003).
181
See Hickman, supra note 12, at 1729 n.9, 1749 (documenting pre–Mayo Foundation
Internal Revenue Manual claims regarding characterization of Treasury regulations and
routine assertions in regulation projects that APA procedural requirements did not apply).
182
See, e.g., Altera, 145 T.C. at 116 (“[The IRS] agrees that the final rule has the force of
law but disagrees with petitioner’s contention that it is a legislative rule.”); Internal Revenue
Manual § 32.1.1.2.6 (Sept. 23, 2011) (explaining, after post–Mayo Foundation revision, that
“[m]ost IRS/Treasury regulations are considered interpretative because the underlying
statute implemented by the regulation contains the necessary legal authority for the action
taken and any effect of the regulation flows directly from that statute”); id. § 32.1.2.3(3)
(continuing to assert that “most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative”); see also, e.g.,
Method of Accounting for Gains and Losses on Shares in Money Market Funds; Broker
Returns With Respect to Sales of Shares in Money Market Funds, T.D. 9774, 81 Fed. Reg.
44,508, 44,513 (July 8, 2016), 2016-30 I.R.B. 151, 155 (claiming in preamble to final
Treasury regulations that “section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
chapter 5) does not apply to these regulations”).
183
Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations,
44 Tax Law. 343, 344 (1991).
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comment rulemaking procedures in approximately forty percent of its
regulations.184 Patrick Smith has argued that, contrary to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard in
State Farm,185 “IRS preambles to regulations ordinarily do not explain
why the IRS decided to adopt the particular rules in the regulations.”186
Indeed, for many years, the Internal Revenue Manual specifically
instructed Treasury and IRS regulation drafters that, contrary to State
Farm’s mandate, they did not need to provide such explanations.187
Treasury’s track record in this regard is hardly surprising, given
Treasury’s longtime belief that its regulations are mostly exempt from
APA rulemaking requirements.
IRS guidance documents—specifically, revenue rulings, revenue
procedures, and notices—raise different APA compliance questions.
Revenue rulings formally are “interpretation[s]” and “conclusion[s] of
the [IRS] on how the law is applied to a specific set of facts.”188 Revenue
procedures are “statements of practice and procedure issued primarily
for internal use,”189 although both Treasury and the IRS acknowledge
that they may “affect[] the rights or duties of taxpayers or other
members of the public under the [IRC] and related statutes.”190 Notices
are “public pronouncement[s] by the Service that may contain guidance
that involves substantive interpretations of” the tax laws, though their
original purpose in contrast to revenue rulings was to allow the IRS to
184

Hickman, supra note 12, at 1748.
State Farm, 463 U.S. 29; see also supra note 130 and accompanying text (summarizing
the State Farm decision).
186
Smith, supra note 12, at 274–75.
187
At the time Smith wrote his article, the Internal Revenue Manual instructed, “In the
Explanation of Provisions section [of a regulatory preamble], the drafting team should
describe the substantive provisions of the regulation in clear, concise, plain language . . . . It
is not necessary to justify the rules that are being proposed or adopted or alternatives that
were considered.” Internal Revenue Manual § 32.1.5.4.7.3(1) (Sept. 30, 2011). The IRS has
since revised the Internal Revenue Manual to omit the second sentence of that instruction. Id.
§ 32.1.5.4.7.3(1) (Oct. 20, 2014). But old habits die hard. Cf. Altera, 145 T.C. at 119
(rejecting Treasury regulation on State Farm grounds but observing that the IRS “contends
that we should not review the final rule under State Farm because the Supreme Court has
never, and this Court has rarely, reviewed Treasury regulations under State Farm”).
188
Rev. Proc. 2012-4, 2012-1 I.R.B. 125, § 3.07.
189
Rev. Proc. 55-1, 1955-2 C.B. 891, § 3.
190
Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b) (2012); see also Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814,
§ 3.02 (using a similar definition).
185
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provide immediate, informal guidance as needed and appropriate.191 The
IRS rarely seeks public comments in issuing any of these guidance
documents; on the rare occasions when the IRS does seek public input, it
does not purport to comply with APA procedural requirements.
Treasury and the IRS contend that these guidance documents “do not
have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations,”192 and
the Supreme Court in 1965 declared that they “have only such force as
Congress chooses to give them, and Congress has not given them the
force of law.”193 Thus, most tax practitioners generally assume that these
IRS guidance documents are exempt from APA notice-and-comment
rulemaking requirements as interpretative rules, procedural rules, or
policy statements.194 Yet, the IRS uses guidance documents more often
than it once did to make pronouncements that seem to create law rather
than merely interpret existing law.195 Also, failing to follow an
applicable revenue ruling, revenue procedure, or notice when filing a tax
return now can expose a taxpayer to penalties.196 The Cohen case,
discussed above,197 concerned an IRS notice that a district court on
remand declared to be a procedurally invalid legislative rule under the
APA.198

191
Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings,
Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 87 Taxes, Aug. 2009,
at 21, 26.
192
Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d).
193
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965).
194
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012).
195
See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 504–05
(2013) [hereinafter Hickman, Unpacking] (documenting examples); Kristin E. Hickman,
IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 239,
243–52 [hereinafter Hickman, IRB Guidance] (same).
196
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (1991) (including revenue rulings and notices among
“rules or regulations” giving rise to penalties for noncompliance); Accuracy-related Penalty,
T.D. 8381, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492, 67,494 (Dec. 31, 1991), 1992-1 C.B. 374, 376 (indicating
same for some revenue procedures).
197
See supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text (summarizing Cohen, 650 F.3d 717).
198
In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 138,
142–43 (D.D.C. 2012).
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2. The Expanded Scope of Tax Administration
The coverage of Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents
has also expanded significantly in recent decades. The guiding purpose
of the federal tax system historically has been, and to a great extent still
is, to raise revenue to fund government programs. Nina Olson, the
National Taxpayer Advocate, has described the IRS as “the federal
government’s accounts receivable department.”199 Without the tax
revenue the IRS collects, the U.S. government would cease to function.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Bull v. United States, “taxes are the
life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an
imperious need.”200 Courts and scholars have often cited the IRS’s
unique mission to justify differences between tax administrative
practices and general administrative law norms, including but not
limited to applying the AIA to preclude pre-enforcement judicial review
of Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents.201
In the past, most Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents
that affected the rights and obligations of taxpayers related directly to
the determination of the amount of tax each taxpayer owed in a given
taxable year.202 At least in theory, aggrieved taxpayers could seek
judicial review of such provisions in two ways: (1) prepare a tax return
in compliance with the regulation or guidance document, pay the
associated taxes, and seek a refund, or (2) prepare a noncompliant tax
return and disclose noncompliance, which should prompt the IRS to
examine the tax return, leading to a deficiency assessment that could

199

Nina E. Olson, Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, Internal Revenue Serv., 1 2012 Annual
Report to Congress 40, https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/
downloads/Volume-1.pdf.
200
295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
201
See id. at 259–60; see also Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax
Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 Va. Tax Rev. 269, 279–80 (2012) (identifying the
“revenue imperative” as the claimed justification for “several features of tax administration
that uniquely advantage” the IRS, including the AIA); Nina E. Olson, 2010 Erwin N.
Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel: Taking the Bull by Its
Horns: Some Thoughts on Constitutional Due Process in Tax Collection, 63 Tax Law. 227,
232 (2010) (making a similar connection regarding the AIA).
202
Hickman, Tax System We Have, supra note 14, at 1729–30 (observing that Treasury
expenditures were about $60 billion in the 1960s, which is far less than the annual
expenditures today of over a trillion dollars).
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then be challenged in the Tax Court.203 Thus, even if the AIA barred preenforcement judicial review of Treasury regulations, a taxpayer had
avenues to get to court to raise his challenge.204
This traditional understanding of judicial review in tax cases has been
complicated by a legislative trend of incorporating into the IRC dozens
of social welfare and regulatory programs, some quite extensive, with
only a tangential relationship to revenue raising.205 For example, the IRC
contains hundreds of tax expenditure items representing more than $1
trillion of indirect government spending each year.206 Antipoverty
programs aimed at the working poor, such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit (“EITC”) and the Child Tax Credit, are structured as refundable
tax credits rather than direct subsidies.207 Subsidies for the purchase of
health insurance are also structured as tax credits rather than as direct
payments.208
Treasury and the IRS are key health care and pension regulators
through ERISA and the Affordable Care Act, the provisions of which
are enforced by denying eligibility for deductions or exclusions or by
imposing penalties labeled as excise taxes that few people pay.209
Treasury and the IRS are also key regulators of the nonprofit sector, as
Congress has made eligibility for tax-exempt status contingent upon
compliance with a variety of different regulatory requirements contained

203

See Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 14, at 1183–90 (explaining how
aggrieved taxpayers might seek judicial review through refund or deficiency actions).
204
But see id. (documenting this understanding but explaining why reality is not quite so
simple).
205
Cf. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (recognizing that the IRS’s role in
administering the Affordable Care Act is outside the agency’s traditional expertise).
206
See S. Comm. on the Budget, 112th Cong., Tax Expenditures: Compendium of
Background Material on Individual Provisions 1, 11 (Comm. Print 2012).
207
See generally David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 Yale L.J. 955, 961, 997–1027 (2004) (discussing Congress’s
integration of spending programs into the IRC, comparing the EITC and food stamp
programs); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income
Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1867, 1876–98 (2005) (comparing and contrasting the EITC,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and food stamps).
208
See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 538–39 (noting the Affordable Care Act’s goals and size).
209
See Hickman, Tax System We Have, supra note 14, at 1732–33 (documenting the role
of Treasury and the IRS in administering ERISA and the Affordable Care Act).
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in the IRC.210 Contemporary Treasury regulations implement policies
concerning “the environment, conservation, green energy,
manufacturing, innovation, education, saving, retirement, health care,
child care, welfare, corporate governance, export promotion, charitable
giving, governance of tax exempt organizations, and economic
development.”211 In one recent five-year period, at least a plurality of
Treasury regulations promulgated concerned such matters, rather than
more traditional tax issues.212
For this reason, many contemporary Treasury regulations do not
directly relate to the computation of a taxpayer’s annual tax liability at
all but rather are more akin to the regulations adopted by other agencies.
Parties subject to these regulations are not in the traditional position of
paying more taxes with their tax return and then suing for a refund or
filing a return documenting their noncompliance and hoping to generate
a deficiency notice.213 Absent pre-enforcement review, such regulations
may be permanently shielded from judicial oversight, no matter how
egregiously the IRS disregards APA requirements.
II. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT’S LOST ROOTS
Gleaning Congress’s precise intent with the AIA has always been a
challenge. The Supreme Court has long observed that Congress sought
to protect the government’s ability to expeditiously assess and collect
the tax revenues it needs to function.214 As noted above, however, that
concern has never stopped the courts from recognizing nonstatutory
exceptions from the AIA’s limitation on judicial review. Rather, the
difficulty for the courts has been consistency in drawing the AIA’s
210

See generally James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y.C.
L. Rev. 303, 303–04 (2006) (noting the tax system’s role in the nonprofit sector); Hickman,
Tax System We Have, supra note 14, at 1732–34 (same).
211
Pamela F. Olson, Woodworth Lecture: And Then Cnut Told Reagan . . . Lessons from
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 12–13 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
212
See Hickman, Tax System We Have, supra note 14, at 1746–53 (documenting study
results).
213
See generally Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 14 (detailing the difficulties
that such parties face in seeking judicial review).
214
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 731–32 & n.7 (1974); Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (“In this manner the United States
is assured of prompt collection of its lawful revenue.”); Taylor v. Secor, 92 U.S. 575, 613–
14 (1875).
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precise boundaries. Here, Congress has offered little direct guidance.
Justice Lewis Powell in Bob Jones University v. Simon observed that
“[t]he Anti-Injunction Act apparently has no recorded legislative
history.”215 Legal scholars also have largely ignored the AIA for much
of its existence, contributing to the lack of historical understanding
regarding the details of congressional intent.
Nevertheless, the AIA was not adopted in a vacuum. The AIA dates
back to 1867 and several new taxes, including the nation’s first income
tax, adopted briefly to finance the Civil War.216 Although most of the
Civil War taxes were short lived, they prompted Congress to establish
the statutory foundations for administrative practices that can be traced
directly to contemporary tax administration.217 Consequently,
understanding Civil War–era revenue legislation and the evolution of tax
administration from the Civil War to the present offers key insights into
what Congress intended to accomplish when it adopted the AIA.
Moreover, as one follows the statutory text and context of the AIA from
Civil War revenue legislation into the Revised Statutes and finally into
the modern IRC, it becomes apparent that Congress has repeatedly
readopted the AIA without revisiting or changing its original core
meaning, even as Congress has changed other aspects of tax
administration substantially. In short, historical analysis provides a
powerful tool for resolving the AIA’s meaning and scope.
A. Civil War–Era Origins
In the decades before the Civil War, the federal government
supported itself primarily through the tariff.218 Tax administration was
largely a function of customhouses at ports and border crossings.219
Congress imposed a monetary fine on merchants who submitted

215
416 U.S. at 736 (citing Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal
Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 109 n.9 (1935)); see also Erin
Morrow Hawley, The Equitable Anti-Injunction Act, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 81, 95 (2014)
(noting an absence of any congressional record defining the scope of the AIA).
216
Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471, 475.
217
See infra Section II.C (tracing the assessment and collection functions from the Civil
War to the present).
218
Steven A. Bank et al., War and Taxes 24 (2008); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the
Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940, at 221 (2013).
219
Parrillo, supra note 218, at 224–26.
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inaccurate paperwork.220 Intentional tax evasion was punishable by
forfeiture of goods.221 Although smuggling was not uncommon,
intentional evasion of the tax laws more often took the form of falsified
paperwork.222 Customs officers who discovered intentional evasion
received a bounty equal to a percentage of the value of the goods
seized.223 As one might anticipate, customs officers had an incentive to
label paperwork inaccuracies as intentional rather than accidental.224
Wars are expensive. To finance the Civil War, Congress adopted a
collection of new “internal” taxes.225 Congress started in 1861 with
legislation adopting the nation’s first income tax, along with a “direct”
tax on land apportioned state by state.226 Quickly recognizing the 1861
Act was inadequate, less than a year later, in 1862, Congress enacted
more comprehensive revenue legislation that included a more
sophisticated income tax, as well as an inheritance tax, a gross receipts
tax on businesses, and a passel of excise taxes, license fees, and stamp
duties.227
Lacking an administrative apparatus for these new internal taxes,228
the government initially collected no revenue from them.229 Therefore,
first in the 1861 Act and then again in the 1862 Act, Congress
established new administrative structures and procedures for that
purpose. The 1862 Act established a Commissioner of Internal Revenue

220

Id.
Id.
222
Id. at 224–25.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 226–27.
225
Cf. Sheldon D. Pollack, The First National Income Tax, 1861–1872, 67 Tax Law. 311,
312 (2014) (using the term).
226
Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, §§ 8, 49, 12 Stat. 292, 294–96, 309; see also Bank et al.,
supra note 218, at 37–38 (summarizing the taxes adopted in the 1861 Act).
227
Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432; see also Bank et al., supra note 218, at 37–
38 (summarizing the taxes adopted in the 1862 Act).
228
Harry Edwin Smith, The United States Federal Internal Tax History from 1861 to 1871,
at 271 (1914) (“When the direct and income taxes were levied by the Act of August 5, 1861,
there were no officers whose duty it was to collect such taxes.”).
229
See Bank et al., supra note 218, at 37 (observing that Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase
initially “failed to nominate anyone to serve as commissioner of taxes, further frustrating the
creation of a collection mechanism for internal taxes”); Pollack, supra note 225, at 320 (“In
fact, no revenue was ever collected under the income tax of 1861.”).
221
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charged with administering the new internal taxes.230 Congress also
instructed the President to divide the country geographically into
collection districts and empowered the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint “assessors” and “collectors” for each
such district to enforce the new taxes.231 Congress also authorized the
presidentially appointed assessors to divide their respective collection
districts further into smaller assessment districts, and the Commissioner
would appoint assistant assessors from among the residents of each such
district.232
The administrative provisions of the 1861 Act focused primarily on
the direct tax, rather than the income tax.233 The 1862 Act, by
comparison, created a set of “General Provisions” “for the purpose of
assessing, levying, and collecting” all of the “duties or taxes” imposed
thereby, which provisions were then modified as appropriate for the
different taxes imposed by the Act.234 For example, the 1862 Act
specifically called for taxpayers to file income tax returns with the
assistant assessors for their districts by May 1 and pay their income
taxes by June 30 of each year.235 The 1862 Act also provided specifically
for withholding income taxes from the wages of government employees
and from payments of dividends and interest made by corporations.236
Regardless, the 1862 Act detailed at length a process for “assessing”
and “collecting” the new taxes, including but not limited to the income
tax.237 Congress tasked assistant assessors with receiving tax returns,
with visiting taxpayers in their districts individually to investigate their
potential liability for taxes, and, if a taxpayer either failed to file or
submitted a fraudulent return, with preparing a return on the taxpayer’s

230

Revenue Act of 1862 § 1; see also Pollack, supra note 225, at 322 (describing the
office’s establishment).
231
Revenue Act of 1862 § 2; see also Revenue Act of 1861 § 9 (providing similarly).
232
Revenue Act of 1862 § 3; see also Revenue Act of 1861 § 11 (providing similarly).
233
Compare Revenue Act of 1861 §§ 8–48 (concerning the direct tax), with id. §§ 50–51
(concerning the income tax).
234
Revenue Act of 1862 §§ 2–38.
235
Id. §§ 91–92.
236
Id. § 86; see also Sidney Ratner, American Taxation: Its History as a Social Force in
Democracy 74–75 (1942) (discussing income tax withholding at the source).
237
Revenue Act of 1862 §§ 2–36.
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behalf “according to the best information” available.238 Based on the
returns filed and investigations performed, assistant assessors had thirty
days after the statutory filing deadline to provide the assessors with
alphabetized lists of taxpayers and the taxes they allegedly owed.239 The
assessors then made the lists publicly available, advertising in county
newspapers and posting in public places the time and location where
taxpayers might examine the lists.240 These lists served as tentative
assessments, informing taxpayers of their proposed tax liabilities.
Taxpayers could appeal from those proposed assessments, and assessors
were responsible for considering such appeals before submitting final
lists of “sums payable” to their respective collection districts.241 Upon
receiving said final lists from the assessors, collectors were charged with
publishing the lists again, this time designating the listed taxes as due.242
People who failed to pay the taxes owed within a specified period after
such publication—ten days generally, but thirty days for income taxes,
for example—were assessed an additional ten percent penalty and given
another ten days to comply.243 After that, a delinquent taxpayer’s
personal or real property could be levied, “distrained” (i.e., seized), and
sold.244
Judicial review threatened to derail the assessment and collection
process envisioned by the 1862 Act. When collectors brought suit to
seize and liquidate the property of delinquent taxpayers, taxpayers
fought back by requesting declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds that the taxes were “erroneously or illegally assessed.”245
Although courts of the era generally were reluctant to interfere with tax
238
Id. §§ 7, 9, 93; see also Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. Econ. 416,
435–36 (1894) (describing the process of assessing income taxes owed).
239
Revenue Act of 1862 § 14.
240
Id. § 15; see also Hill, supra note 238, at 436 (noting the “custom [of] publish[ing] the
incomes of individual tax-payers [sic] in the local newspapers”).
241
Revenue Act of 1862 §§ 6, 16; see also Hill, supra note 238, at 436 (noting the
availability of appeal).
242
Revenue Act of 1862 § 19.
243
Id. §§ 19, 92; see also Smith, supra note 228, at 275 (describing the collection process).
244
Revenue Act of 1862 §§ 19–21, 93.
245
See, e.g., Roback v. Taylor, 20 F. Cas. 852, 852, 854 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1866) (No.
11,877); Magee v. Denton, 16 F. Cas. 382, 382–83 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 8,943); cf.
Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 192 (1883) (dismissing a challenge to an assessment of tax
liability on AIA grounds).
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collections in this way, exceptions abounded.246 Subjecting federal
collection efforts to judicial supervision threatened to slow tax
collections and thereby deprive the government of a constant stream of
revenue. Though not addressing the AIA specifically, Justice Noah
Haynes Swayne observed in Springer v. United States, “The prompt
payment of taxes is always important to the public welfare. It may be
vital to the existence of a government. The idea that every tax-payer
[sic] is entitled to the delays of litigation is unreason.”247
To stop judicial review from thwarting the collection of taxes, in the
Revenue Act of 1867, Congress amended Section 19 of the 1862 Act to
include the language paralleling that of the current AIA, preventing suits
from “restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.”248 By this
language, the AIA forced aggrieved taxpayers to pay their taxes as
assessed and sue the government for a refund, rather than seek
declaratory and injunctive relief to keep collectors from seizing their
property.249 Congress did not elaborate on the scope of the amendment,
but it had no need to do so.250 Section 19 was the part of the 1862 Act
that provided the procedures for collecting taxes after the assessors
supplied the collectors with the lists of taxes assessed.251 Thus, the
amendment fit neatly into Section 19 as a limited remedy for judicial
obstruction of those particular procedures.252 As the original Section 19
described how revenue would be collected once taxes had been assessed,
the new AIA language facilitated collections by precluding judicial
review from stalling that specific process once it had begun. Congress
did not need to be more specific about the AIA’s scope because the

246

1 James L. High, A Treatise on the Law of Injunctions § 484 (2d ed. 1880).
102 U.S. 586, 594 (1880).
248
Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471, 475.
249
See id. The previous year, Congress had also added language precluding suits “for the
recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until
appeal shall have been duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue.” Act of July 13,
1866, ch. 184, § 19, 14 Stat. 98, 152.
250
Bob Jones, 416 U.S. at 736 (observing that “[t]he Anti-Injunction Act apparently has no
recorded legislative history” (citing Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of
Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 109 n. 9 (1935))); see
also Hawley, supra note 215, at 95 (noting an absence of any congressional record defining
the scope of the AIA).
251
Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 19, 12 Stat. 432, 439.
252
Id.
247
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meaning of the new restriction on judicial review was obvious from its
statutory context.253
Most of the Civil War internal taxes expired or were repealed by the
end of 1872.254 A few internal taxes were retained, such as excise taxes
on alcoholic beverages and tobacco,255 so much of the tax administrative
apparatus established in the 1860s was left in place.256 In 1872, Congress
abolished the assessor and assistant assessor positions but not the
assessment function, which Congress transferred to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.257 Other than the abolition of the assessor and assistant
assessor positions, the assessment and collection provisions adopted in
1862 and thereafter, including the AIA, continued to be part of the
federal tax laws.258
B. Post–Civil War Textual and Contextual Constancy
The federal tax laws, and the administrative practices utilized to
administer them, have changed in many ways since the Civil War era.
The customs duties that comprised the bulk of tax revenue collected
throughout the 1800s now represent merely one percent of total
receipts.259 As recently as 1940, the federal government collected more
253

For that matter, Congress might not have felt it necessary to explain the AIA because it
codified already existing principles of equity jurisprudence. See Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 F.
Cas. 44, 48 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870) (No. 11,463) (describing the AIA as “wholly unnecessary,
enacted only as a politic and kindly publication of an old and familiar rule”).
254
The Revenue Act of 1862 called for the Civil War income tax to cease after 1866. See
Revenue Act of 1862 § 92. Congress later extended the tax through 1871. See Revenue Act
of 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98; Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471; Revenue Act of
1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256; see also W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A
Short History 29 (1996) (noting that Congress let the income tax expire in 1872); Pollack,
supra note 225, at 327 (documenting extensions). Other Civil War taxes, like the inheritance,
excise, and stamp taxes, were repealed. See Bank et al., supra note 218, at 46 (documenting
this history).
255
Act of Dec. 24, 1872, ch. 13, §§ 2–3, 17 Stat. 401, 402.
256
Harold Dubroff & Brant J. Hellwig, The United States Tax Court: An Historical
Analysis 14 (2d ed. 2014).
257
Act of Dec. 24, 1872 §§ 1–3, 17 Stat. at 401–02.
258
See generally 1 Rev. Stat. §§ 3172–3231 (1875) (containing statutory provisions
governing assessment and collection functions, including the AIA in § 3224).
259
According to historical tables prepared by the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”), in 2016, receipts from all sources totaled $3.267 trillion, and receipts from
customs duties and other fees totaled $34 billion. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Table 2.1—
Receipts by Source: 1934–2022, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
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revenue from internal alcohol and tobacco excise taxes than it did from
either individual or corporate income taxes.260 Individual income taxes
that had only briefly existed and social insurance taxes that no one had
yet contemplated at the time of the Civil War now constitute more than
eighty percent of government receipts.261 As the sources of government
revenue have changed, tax administrative practices have evolved as
well, particularly as regards the timing of assessment and collection.
By comparison, at least textually, the AIA’s core language remains
remarkably unchanged. Most of the changes to the AIA’s text have
taken the form of exceptions added by Congress over time, often when
the IRS or the courts have interpreted and applied the AIA in ways that
strike Congress as unfair. By contrast, the arrangement of some of the
IRC’s administrative provisions and the placement of the AIA within the
IRC have changed significantly. Therein may lie at least some of the
confusion regarding the AIA’s proper scope and meaning.
1. Changes to the Anti-Injunction Act’s Text
The only major change to the primary text of the AIA since the Civil
War comes from the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. With that
legislation, Congress added the phrase “whether or not such person is
the person against whom such tax was assessed” to the end of the AIA’s
core prohibition against judicial review of cases “restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax.”262 Although its language seems
expansive, the change was not aimed at expanding the AIA’s scope to
limit judicial review further. Rather, as part of the same legislation,
Congress added I.R.C. § 7426, providing a mechanism whereby third
parties could seek judicial review when the IRS levied or sold their
Historicals [https://perma.cc/2ZDD-AE3A] [hereinafter OMB Table 2.1]; Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Table 2.5—Composition of “Other Receipts”: 1940–2022, available at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals [https://perma.cc/2ZDD-AE3A] [hereinafter OMB
Table 2.5].
260
Again according to OMB historical tables, in 1940, the government collected $1.229
billion in alcohol and tobacco excise taxes, $892 million in individual income taxes, and
$1.197 billion in corporate income taxes. OMB Table 2.1; OMB Table 2.5.
261
OMB Table 2.1 (showing in 2016 roughly $1.55 trillion in individual income taxes and
$1.15 trillion in social insurance and retirement receipts as compared to $3.27 trillion in total
government receipts).
262
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125, 1144 (codified at
I.R.C. § 7421 (2012)).
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property to satisfy the tax liability of another—as might occur, for
example, where property is jointly owned.263 Legislative history
explaining the change described circumstances in which courts,
presumably applying the AIA, had denied third parties judicial relief
when the IRS wrongfully levied their property or denied their claims to
excess proceeds from property sales.264 Along with the above-quoted
language, the Federal Tax Lien Act also added to the AIA a separate
cross-reference to I.R.C. § 7426 as an exception from the AIA’s
limitation on judicial review.265 The two additions together ensured that
courts would confine the new authorization of third-party suits to the
terms of I.R.C. § 7426 without eroding the overall scope of the AIA’s
core text.
Aside from the language concerning third parties, the only changes to
the AIA have come when Congress added specific statutory exceptions
from the AIA by cross-reference to other provisions both within and
outside the IRC. The first and most sweeping set of exceptions by crossreference accompanied the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals
(“BTA”) and later carried over to the BTA’s successor, the Tax Court.
Having again relied principally on tariffs and a small number of
internal taxes for revenue in the decades after the Civil War,266 Congress
adopted the corporate income tax in 1909 and the modern individual
income tax in 1913.267 These taxes were small initially, but World War I
saw the expansion of the individual income tax as well as the addition of
an excess profits tax.268 The number of tax returns filed increased
dramatically, and the difficulties of administering the tax system
multiplied as well.

263
S. Rep. No. 1708 pt. II, at 29 (1966); see also id. pt. I, at 3 (“In general terms, these
modifications are intended to represent a reasonable accommodation of the interests of the
Government in collecting the taxes of delinquent taxpayers with the rights of the taxpayers
and third parties.”).
264
Id. pt. II, at 29.
265
See id. (linking the change to I.R.C. § 7421(a) to the addition of I.R.C. § 7426).
266
Congress briefly adopted an income tax with the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894.
Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 29, 28 Stat. 509, 554. The Supreme Court invalidated that
income tax in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895).
267
Dubroff & Hellwig, supra note 256, at 14.
268
See, e.g., Bank et al., supra note 218, at 52–79 (discussing legislative action to fund
World War I).
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Prior to World War I, the IRS was in the habit of examining every
income tax return that was filed.269 In the aftermath of World War I, with
its accompanying expansion of the individual income tax, the IRS had
an enormous backlog of unaudited income tax returns, and the
government badly needed additional revenue to cover war expenditures.
To resolve the administrative difficulty, the IRS decided to summarily
disallow every seemingly questionable deduction on a large number of
returns, assess the resulting taxes immediately, and rely on subsequent
refund and abatement claims to resolve any errors.270 Unsurprisingly,
these summary assessments were controversial and merely led to more
problems.
These and other difficulties associated with an expanding federal tax
system prompted Congress to introduce additional key administrative
reforms. In particular for purposes of the AIA, in 1921, Congress began
requiring the IRS to issue deficiency notices and allow taxpayers thirty
days to seek an administrative appeal before assessing additional
taxes.271 Subsequently, in 1924, Congress created the BTA as an
independent tribunal to which taxpayers could appeal such deficiency
notices and expanded the time for making such appeals to sixty days.272
With such appeals, the IRS generally could pursue assessment and
collection only after the BTA determined that a deficiency did in fact
exist.273 In 1926, Congress provided that, notwithstanding the AIA,
courts could enjoin IRS assessment and collection of taxes pending the
.

269

Dubroff & Hellwig, supra note 256, at 14.
Id. at 21. Abatement claims were administrative appeals submitted after taxes were
assessed but before they were paid. Id. at 22. Although filed by enough taxpayers in the
World War I era to interfere with IRS collection efforts, abatement claims were subject to
several onerous requirements and restrictions, including that the claimant post a bond to
ensure payment of the assessed taxes. Id. Consequently, Congress and the IRS quickly
established alternative remedies to resolve the problems of summary assessments. Id. at 22–
23. The contemporary IRC authorizes abatements under certain limited circumstances, but
not for income, estate, or gift taxes. I.R.C. § 6404(a)–(b); see also Michael I. Saltzman, IRS
Practice and Procedure ¶ 11.04 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing present-day abatement claims).
271
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 266.
272
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 274, 308, 900, 43 Stat. 253, 297, 308, 336; see also
Dubroff & Hellwig, supra note 256, at 49–81 (detailing the creation of the BTA).
273
Revenue Act of 1924 §§ 274, 308.
270
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BTA’s resolution of a deficiency appeal.274 Finally, when Congress
codified the tax laws as the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, it amended
the AIA itself to incorporate cross-references to the provisions
permitting appeals of deficiency notices to the BTA and authorizing
courts generally to enjoin assessments and collections until the
conclusion of those appeals.275
As in the 1939 Code, today’s AIA cross-references I.R.C. §§ 6212(a)
and (c) and 6213(a), which govern deficiency notices and authorize
taxpayers to petition the Tax Court for redetermination of a
deficiency.276 Those provisions in turn include language virtually
identical to that adopted by Congress in 1926, authorizing injunctions
pending Tax Court review.277 Although taxpayers still retain the option
of paying assessed taxes and suing for a refund, the vast majority of tax
cases are deficiency actions heard by the Tax Court.278
The other exceptions-by-cross-reference added to the AIA are more
narrowly tailored. On several occasions, upon identifying specific
circumstances in which applying the AIA too literally would either
impose hardship or deny judicial review altogether, Congress has acted
to clarify and expand the availability of judicial review and to authorize
courts to enjoin assessment or collection pending the same. For example,
in 1998, Congress made innocent spouse relief from joint tax liabilities
easier to obtain by resolving uncertainty regarding Tax Court
jurisdiction over IRS innocent spouse denials, authorizing the Tax Court
to enjoin associated IRS collection actions pending review in such cases,
and incorporating a cross-reference in the AIA.279

274

Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274(b), 308(a), 44 Stat. 9, 55, 75 (cross-referencing
the AIA, which at that time was codified at R.S. § 3224); see also Revenue Act of 1928, ch.
852, § 272(a), 45 Stat. 791, 853 (including similar language in provisions governing BTA
deficiency redeterminations).
275
An Act to Consolidate and Codify the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States, ch.
36, § 3653(a), 53 Stat. 1, 446 (1939) (codified at I.R.C. § 3653 (1940)) (“Except as provided
in sections 272(a), 871(a) and 1012(a), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.”).
276
I.R.C. §§ 6212(a) & (c), 6213(a), 7421(a) (2012).
277
Id. §§ 6212(a) & (c), 6213(a).
278
David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 17, 18 (documenting tax case statistics).
279
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–206,
§ 3201(a), (e), 112 Stat. 685, 734–35, 740 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6015); see also
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A few exceptions-by-cross-reference were adopted in response to
litigation before the Supreme Court. As already noted in Part I, shortly
after the Court decided Bob Jones University v. Simon and Alexander v.
“Americans United” Inc.,280 Congress amended the AIA and the
Declaratory Judgment Act to allow judicial review of exempt status
determinations and revocations, signaling its view that the Court
resolved those cases incorrectly.281 In the same legislation, reacting in
part to Laing v. United States and Commissioner v. Shapiro, also
discussed in Part I, and consistent with the Court’s pro-taxpayer
decisions in those cases,282 Congress amended provisions governing
jeopardy and termination assessments to expand the availability of
judicial review for such IRS actions and, correspondingly, adjusted the
AIA’s cross-references to reflect those changes.283
In summary, since its adoption in the 1860s, the only amendments to
the AIA have come when Congress wanted to expand the availability of
judicial review and, correspondingly, to make clear Congress’s intention
to limit the AIA’s reach. On more than one occasion, those amendments
were a reaction to expansive IRS or judicial interpretations of the AIA
that cut off judicial review in contexts apart from ordinary, run-of-themill enforcement efforts.
2. Changes to the Anti-Injunction Act’s Statutory Context
Although the AIA’s text has remained relatively constant since the
1860s, the placement of the AIA within the tax laws has changed
significantly. Therein may lie at least some of the confusion regarding
the proper scope and meaning of the AIA. Yet historical evidence makes

H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 249–55 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing changes to innocent
spouse relief, and reasons therefore, including expansion of Tax Court jurisdiction).
280
See supra notes 44–49 (describing the Bob Jones and Americans United cases).
281
See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, § 1306, 90 Stat. 1520, 1718; H.R.
Rep. No. 94-658, at 282–86 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3179 (relating
changes to the Bob Jones and Americans United cases).
282
See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (describing the Laing and Shapiro
cases).
283
Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 1204(c)(11), 90 Stat. 1520, 1699; see also Staff of J. Comm.
on Taxation, 94th Cong., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, at 356–64
(Comm. Print 1976) (including discussion of the Laing and Shapiro cases in explaining the
legislative changes).
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quite clear that Congress did not intend changes in the AIA’s location
within the codified tax laws to alter its meaning.
As noted above, in adopting the AIA in 1867, Congress embedded it
within the principal statutory provision governing the collection process,
Section 19 of the Revenue Act of 1862, suggesting that Congress
believed that the need for the AIA was associated directly with the
undertaking of that process. When Congress allowed the Civil War
income tax to expire in 1871 and abolished the assessor and assistant
assessor positions in 1872, it left the AIA in place along with the rest of
the remaining assessment and collection provisions.284
In 1874, Congress revised and codified all then-existing statutes.285
Title 35 of the Revised Statutes contained all of the tax provisions.
Chapter 2 of Title 35, entitled “Of Assessments and Collections,”
divided the statutory text governing those two functions into a few
dozen separate provisions, one of which—Section 3224—was the
AIA.286 Courts and commentators at the time took the view that the
codification of the AIA into a separate provision in the Revised Statutes
did not alter its meaning or scope. In Snyder v. Marks, for example,
Justice Samuel Blatchford wrote, “This enactment in Section 3224 has
no more restricted the meaning than it had when, after the Act of 1867, it
formed a part of Section 19 of the Act of 1866, by being added
thereto.”287
Notwithstanding the emergence of more contemporary mechanisms
for the assessment and collection of internal taxes, as well as the
creation of the Tax Court in the interim, from 1874 until 1954, the
AIA’s placement among the collection provisions remained unchanged,
suggesting its close, proximate relationship with the actual pursuit of the
assessment and collection functions.288 In 1926, Congress approved the
284

See 1 Rev. Stat. §§ 3172–3223 (1875).
Id. § 1.
286
Id. § 3224.
287
109 U.S. 189, 192 (1883).
288
See Comp. Stat. 2088, § 3224 (John A. Mallory) (Vol 2. 1902); Comp. Stat. 934,
§ 5947 (John A. Mallory) (1918); see also Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 119 (1916) (“The
case is here on appeal from the judgment of the court below affirming the action of the trial
court in sustaining a motion to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction because the
complainants had an adequate remedy at law and because of the provision of Rev. Stat.,
§ 3224, that ‘No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court.’”).
285
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current U.S. Code as a replacement for the Revised Statutes.289 That
1926 codification moved the AIA—along with the rest of the tax laws—
from Title 35 to Title 26 but continued to group the AIA with the
provisions describing the collection functions.290
In 1939, Congress recodified the various tax laws as the Internal
Revenue Code (“1939 Code”).291 The reason for the recodification was
simple: the myriad pieces of tax legislation over the years had created a
statutory mess that could be cleaned up most readily by consolidating
and codifying the tax laws afresh.
The great mass of internal-revenue legislation since 1873, scattered
through 34 volumes of the Statutes at Large, makes such a recourse an
exceedingly difficult undertaking, even for the most experienced
lawyer. Statutes are repeated in subsequent acts in almost identical
language, with no reference to prior acts or any expressed intention to
amend or repeal. Provisions of a permanent character are included in
riders and provisos and are hidden in various acts. Amendments are
often involved and obscure. Inconsistencies and duplications
abound.292

As noted above, the only change to the text of the AIA resulting from
the 1939 codification was the addition of cross-references to provisions
allowing courts to enjoin assessment and collection pending resolution
of deficiency appeals to the BTA.293 Legislative history of the 1939
Code is quite clear that Congress did not intend the new codification to
alter the preexisting meaning of any of its provisions.294 Notably,
however, Congress included provisions regarding the BTA in Subtitle A,
along with the income, estate, and gift tax provisions. By contrast,
although Congress separated the provisions addressing assessment into a

289

Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, 44 Stat. 777.
See generally I.R.C. §§ 91–138, 154 (1926) (providing for the assessment and
collection of taxes but also including the Anti-Injunction Act as § 154).
291
An Act to Consolidate and Codify the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States, 53
Stat. 1 (1939) (codified as Title 26 of the U.S.C.).
292
H.R. Rep. No. 76-6, at 2 (1939).
293
See supra notes 271–76 and accompanying text (documenting these changes).
294
S. Rep. No. 76-20, at 1 (1939) (“The following should be noted in connection with the
general character of the code. First. It makes no changes in existing law.”); H.R. Rep. No.
76-6, at 3 (stating the same).
290
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separate subchapter from those concerning collection,295 all of the
assessment and collection provisions were grouped with other general
administrative provisions in Subtitle D. According to legislative history,
the reason for this organizational choice was that BTA review was
limited to those taxes governed by Subtitle A, whereas the assessment
and collection provisions extended to other taxes as well.296 Consistent
with its placement among the collection provisions since 1867, the AIA
remained with the collection provisions in the 1939 Code.297
The placement of the AIA within the codified tax laws changed only
when Congress reorganized and recodified them again in 1954. This
time, Congress sought to revisit the tax laws holistically, incorporating
substantive changes as well as “rearrang[ing] the provisions to place
them in a more logical sequence.”298 As part of that year’s overhaul of
the tax code, Congress moved the AIA from the subchapter about
collections to a new chapter addressing judicial review.299 Detaching the
AIA from its historic place among the provisions governing collections,
and incorporating it among the provisions concerning judicial review,
may have contributed to contemporary perceptions that the AIA’s scope
is broader than historically understood. In the legislative history,
however, Congress specified that its movement of the AIA made “no
material change in existing law.”300 The AIA’s placement has not
changed since.301
In summary, the text of the AIA has been modified several times to
create various statutory exceptions, but its core phrase precluding
judicial review from “restraining the assessment and collection of any
tax” has not changed since 1867. Various codifications have moved the
AIA from among the provisions specifically addressing the collection
function to the provisions governing judicial review more generally.
Regardless of these changes, the available evidence indicates that
295

See I.R.C. §§ 3640–3646 (1940) (governing assessment); id. §§ 3650–3663 (providing
for the collection of taxes, which includes the Anti-Injunction Act).
296
H.R. Rep. No. 76-6, at 3–4.
297
I.R.C. § 3653 (1940).
298
S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 1 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4629.
299
See I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1958) (falling within subchapter B of Chapter 76 of the 1954
Code, with Chapter 76 entitled “Judicial Proceedings” and subchapter B entitled
“Proceedings by taxpayers”).
300
See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 610, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5260.
301
See I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
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Congress at no time intended to alter the meaning or scope of that core
phrase from the original understanding as of 1867.
C. Post–Civil War Evolution of Assessment and Collection
Since 1867, by comparison, key aspects of the assessment and
collection functions have changed quite a bit—particularly as regards
the timing of the assessment function with the receipt of most tax
revenues. Even as it adopted the corporate income tax in 1909 and the
modern individual income tax in 1913, Congress initially retained much
of the existing administrative structure that dated back to the Civil War,
including provisions governing the assessment and collection
functions.302 Employers other than the government were tasked briefly
with withholding income taxes for the first time,303 but this unpopular
measure was repealed four years later.304 Otherwise, much as before,
each taxpayer subject to the income tax needed to file a tax return, just
with his home district collector rather than an assessor and by March 1
rather than May 1.305 Again, the IRS in this era endeavored to examine
virtually every tax return filed,306 and collectors still had the authority to
increase a tax liability upon giving notice to the affected person.307
Taxpayers could appeal such decisions to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,308 who made assessments and notified taxpayers of their
liability by June 1.309 Taxes again became due on June 30.310 Collectors
had the same tools (levy and distraint) to bring recalcitrant taxpayers
into compliance.311 Over the succeeding forty years, however, Congress
302

Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2A–D, 38 Stat. 114, 166–69.
See Anuj C. Desai, What a History of Tax Withholding Tells Us About the
Relationship Between Statutes and Constitutional Law, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859, 882 (2014)
(describing how the Revenue Act of 1913 entrenched withholding at the source into
American tax administration).
304
See id. (documenting this short-lived experiment with wage withholding by
employers).
305
Revenue Act of 1913 § 2D.
306
Dubroff & Hellwig, supra note 256, at 14.
307
Revenue Act of 1913 § 2D.
308
Id.
309
Id. § 2E.
310
Id.
311
See supra note 288 and accompanying text (collecting compiled statutes that list the
collection procedures from the Civil War, which were still in effect).
303
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slowly modified these procedures until modern income tax
administration took shape and diminished the practical significance of
formal assessment and collection functions from the perspective of most
taxpayers and most tax receipts.
As already noted, World War I saw an expansion of the individual
income tax as well as the addition of excess profits taxes.312 The number
of tax returns filed increased substantially, and the difficulties of
administering the tax system using Civil War–era procedures multiplied
as well, prompting a series of reforms, including but not limited to the
creation of the BTA in 1924. Another key change came in 1918, when
Congress made income tax payments due at the same time as the income
tax returns themselves, then on March 15 of each year.313 Taxpayers
could choose to pay their liability in a lump sum on that date or to make
four payments—one on March 15 and the others every three months
thereafter.314 After receiving the returns, the Commissioner of Internal
Review still needed to make final lists assessing the tax liability of each
person.315 Those lists were certified and later sent to the district
collectors who would then, if necessary, take steps to bring taxpayers
into compliance.316 But, obviously, the IRS would no longer have the
opportunity to evaluate the accuracy of tax returns, propose adjustments,
and consider appeals thereof prior to taxes becoming due.
The New Deal and World War II altered the timing of tax payments
further, introducing the concept of “pay-as-you-go taxation.”317 The
Social Security Act provided for employment taxes equal to a
percentage of employees’ wages to be withheld and paid to the
government by employers along with information returns filed
312
See, e.g., Bank et al., supra note 218, at 52–79 (discussing legislative action to fund
World War I).
313
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 227(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1075 (1919).
314
Id. § 250(a).
315
Id. § 3176 (giving the Commissioner the power to assess the taxes provided by the
Act). The assessment provisions from the Revised Statutes of 1872 still applied to describe
how the Commissioner would exercise that power. See 1 Rev. Stat. § 3182 (1875)
(authorizing the Commissioner to make assessments and “certify a list of such assessments
when made to the proper collectors respectively, who shall proceed to collect and account
for the taxes and penalties so certified”).
316
Revenue Act of 1918 § 3176.
317
See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the
Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 685, 703 (1989) (using
the pay-as-you-go term to describe the shift to wage withholding).
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quarterly.318 World War II saw the expansion of the individual income
tax “[f]rom a ‘class tax’ to a ‘mass tax.’”319 Because many people
struggled to make lump sum income tax payments annually or even
quarterly, Congress again turned to wage withholding by employers as
the wages were earned.320 For individuals whose income was not subject
to wage withholding, and later for corporations, Congress instituted a
system of advance installment payments of estimated income taxes.321
As a result of these changes, most taxes are paid before tax returns are
ever filed.
For many years, Congress continued to use the statutory procedures
governing assessments from the 1860s with little change. In 1874, at the
same time that the AIA became part of the Revised Statutes, Congress
also codified the Civil War–era assessment and collection provisions.322
Like the AIA, those assessment provisions also became part of the U.S.
Code in 1926.323 By 1954, however, Congress recognized that sending
millions of tax returns to Washington, D.C. for inspection and
certification was an inefficient system.324 Accordingly, it reformed this
process by transforming assessments into the automatic function we
318
See Desai, supra note 303, at 889–95 (describing introduction and early administration
of Social Security Act tax requirements).
319
See id. at 896 (quoting Jones, supra note 317, at 685–86) (observing that World War II
saw the federal individual income tax base expand from 7 million taxpayers in 1940 to 42
million in 1945).
320
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 172, 56 Stat. 798, 887–92 (adopting wage withholding
for new “Victory Tax” on individuals); Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, § 2, 57
Stat. 126, 128 (expanding wage withholding to the individual income tax as well as the
Victory Tax); see also Desai, supra note 303, at 896–97 (describing the history of World
War II wage withholding provisions in greater depth).
321
Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, § 5, 57 Stat. 126, 141–45 (adopting estimated
income tax payment requirements for individual taxpayers). Congress did not adopt an
estimated tax payment requirement for the corporate income tax until 1954. Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 6655, 68A Stat. 825 (1958) (codified at I.R.C. § 6655
(2012)).
322
See supra notes 285–87 and accompanying text (discussing the codification of existing
laws into the Revised Statutes).
323
See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 91–138, 154 (1926) (providing for the assessment and
collection of taxes but also including the Anti-Injunction Act).
324
See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 572–73 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
5221 (explaining that the change was to “provide[] that the assessments shall be made by
recording the liability of the taxpayer . . . through machine operations or through any other
modern procedure”); H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at A405 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4552 (same).
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have today.325 When a taxpayer files a tax return, his tax liability is
automatically recorded.326 If the IRS has reason to believe an assessment
is inaccurate, then officials may pursue a supplemental assessment, for
example by conducting an audit to verify the taxpayer’s liability.327 This
automatic assessment process remains in place today.
Regarding collection procedures, again, most taxes are now paid in
advance through pay-as-you-go withholding and estimated tax
payments. Employers and other third-party payors who fail to withhold
and remit as the IRC requires are subject to penalties for such failure;328
individuals and corporations who fail to make estimated payments must
pay interest to compensate the government for paying belatedly.329
When taxes have not been paid through withholding, through estimated
payments, or with a tax return, the IRS first demands payment by
letter.330 After a statutorily defined time period, IRS officials may levy,
distrain, and ultimately sell the property of taxpayers to satisfy their
outstanding tax liability.331 As noted above, however, Congress has
frequently added additional procedural protections for taxpayers subject
to these collection actions, expanding notice and hearing requirements,

325

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6203, 68A Stat. 768 (1958) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 6203 (2012)).
326
Id.
327
See I.R.C. § 6204 (1958) (stating that “a supplemental assessment” may be made
“whenever it is ascertained that any assessment is imperfect or incomplete in any material
respect”).
328
See I.R.C. § 6672(a) (2012).
329
See id. §§ 6621(a)(2), 6654(a), 6655(a).
330
Compare 1 Rev. Stat. § 3184 (1875) (stating that, after a collector receives a list from
the Commissioner, he shall “give notice to each person liable to pay any taxes stated therein,
to be left at his dwelling or usual place of business, or to be sent by mail”), with I.R.C.
§ 6303 (2012) (“[A]fter the making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section 6203,” the
Secretary shall “give notice to each person liable for the unpaid tax, stating the amount and
demanding payment thereof. Such notice shall be left at the dwelling or usual place of
business of such person, or shall be sent by mail to such person’s last known address.”).
331
Compare 1 Rev. Stat. § 3187 (stating that, if a person neglects to pay taxes “within ten
days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the collector . . . to collect the said
tax[]”), and id. § 3188 (“In such case of neglect . . . the collector may levy . . . upon all
property and rights to property . . . .”), with I.R.C. § 6321 (“If any person liable to pay any
tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor
of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person.”).
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authorizing judicial review, and staying collection pending the
completion of those processes.332
In summary, both at the time of the Civil War and in the early days of
the modern income tax, examinations and agency-level appeals could
and often did occur in the period between the filing of a return and the
acts of assessing taxes and pursuing collections based on that return.
Indeed, the system of assessments and collections adopted by Congress
in 1862 clearly contemplated precisely that procedural sequence.
Moreover, most taxes did not come due and were not paid until after
returns were filed and assessments were made. The post-return, preassessment period was a critical one in which a taxpayer might seek
injunctive relief upon becoming aware that an adjustment had been
proposed. But, even more significantly, without the AIA to protect the
government’s ability to pursue the assessment and collection functions
unimpeded by judicial review, the government might have been entirely
unable to obtain the funds it needed to operate. Today, by contrast,
because of pay-as-you-go taxation mechanisms of third-party
withholding and advance estimated tax payments, most taxes are paid
before a return is ever filed. Assessments take place automatically upon
the filing of a return without an examination of the return’s content.
Subsequent examinations and appeals may lead to additional
assessments. And absent the AIA, taxpayers facing an audit could seek
injunctive and declaratory relief rather than waiting for a deficiency
notice and petitioning the Tax Court. But those secondary assessments,
while significant, do not represent the bulk of tax collections.
D. Taxes and Penalties, Rules and Regulations
The AIA does not define the term “tax.” Consequently, at least in
theory, IRS assessment and collection of amounts not designated as
taxes would not be covered by the AIA. The courts have long construed
the term broadly for AIA purposes. Nevertheless, labels have
occasionally proved deceptive in this regard.
When the AIA was first adopted in 1867, the word “tax” carried the
same ordinary meaning as it does today. For instance, Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, which was published in that same year, defines a tax as “a
contribution imposed by government on individuals for the service of
332

See Subsection II.B.1 (describing the addition of various exceptions from the AIA).
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the state.”333 The Supreme Court’s only major decision concerning the
meaning of the word “tax” came in 1883 with the Snyder case, wherein
the Court considered whether an allegedly erroneous or illegal tax
assessment should qualify as a tax for AIA purposes.334 Snyder involved
a farmer who sought to enjoin revenue officials from seizing and selling
his property to collect an allegedly illegally assessed tax on his farming
business.335 His claims were several, including that the assessment was
both untimely and unclear for failing to specify the basis for the tax and
that revenue officials should have pursued a bond he posted to ensure
stamp tax compliance instead of seizing other property.336 As to the
merits, the Court observed at least that various notations on the
assessment made clear that it concerned stamp taxes on the farmer’s
tobacco crop. Regardless, the Court held that the AIA foreclosed its
consideration of all of the farmer’s claims.337 According to the Court,
Congress passed the AIA precisely for the purpose of stopping taxpayers
from bringing suits challenging taxes “alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected.”338 Thus, the Court elaborated, the
word “tax” in the AIA means “that which is in a condition to be
collected as a tax, and is claimed by the proper public officers to be a
tax, although . . . alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed.”339 In essence, right from the start, Snyder laid down the basic
principle that the AIA extends to claims that the IRS has misconstrued
and thus exceeded its statutory authority in attempting to collect taxes.
Nevertheless, based on the plain language of the statute, the Court has
often held that the AIA applies only to taxes and not to other exactions
333
2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 578 (12th ed. 1868); see also William A. Wheeler,
A Dictionary of the English Language 737 (Chauncey A. Goodrich & Noah Porter eds.,
1872) (defining “tax” as “[a] charge, especially a pecuniary burden imposed by authority; as,
(a.) A levy made upon property for the support of government. (b.) Especially, the sum laid
upon a specific thing, as upon polls, lands, houses, income, &c”).
334
109 U.S. at 192. The Court did, however, mention the AIA several times in cases
involving state taxes. See, e.g., Andreae v. Redfield, 98 U.S. 225, 232 (1878); Taylor v.
Secor, 92 U.S. 575, 613 (1875); Hornthall v. Internal Revenue Collector, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
560, 566 (1869); City of Philadelphia v. The Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 733 (1866).
335
109 U.S. at 189.
336
Id. at 190.
337
Id. at 192–93.
338
Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 19, 14 Stat. 98, 152, as amended by Act of March 2,
1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471, 475.
339
Snyder, 109 U.S. at 192.
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such as penalties.340 Distinguishing between taxes and penalties,
however, is a notoriously arduous task.341 Complicating matters, courts
have treated at least some penalties as taxes for AIA purposes342 and
vice versa.343 Treating certain penalties as taxes for assessment and
collection purposes has deep textual and historical roots, which perhaps
explains, at least in part, some of the more recent AIA jurisprudence
surrounding the meaning of the term “tax” as regards IRC penalty
provisions.
From the very beginning of the AIA’s existence, Congress has used
two different main types of penalties to encourage compliance with the
tax laws. The first type is criminal penalties, which arise when a
taxpayer takes willful action to avoid tax liability.344 Internal revenue
officials enforce these penalties through the criminal justice system.345
The second type of penalties is civil in nature and is assessed and
collected in the same manner as taxes.346
The distinction between criminal and civil penalties dates back at
least to the Civil War. Many penalties in that era were specified by
reference to a certain percentage of the associated taxes. For example, in
Section 14 of the Revenue Act of 1864, Congress authorized revenue
authorities to add either a fifty or a one hundred percent addition to
income taxes whenever a taxpayer either failed to file or filed an
inaccurate list or return as required.347 The Act states: “[A]nd the amount
340

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544–45 (2012); Lipke v.
Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1922); Tovar v. Jarecki, 173 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1949).
341
Cf. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of
the Tax Power, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1195, 1196 (2012) (recognizing the difficulty and describing
the Supreme Court’s efforts to distinguish between taxes and penalties for Commerce Clause
purposes as “inadequate to the task”).
342
See, e.g., Nuttelman v. Vossberg, 753 F.2d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam); Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 527 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1975).
343
See, e.g., Tovar, 173 F.2d at 451.
344
See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1867 §§ 9, 12, 28–29, 32 (establishing various tax crimes);
I.R.C. § 7201 (establishing criminal penalties for willful tax evasion). For a more extended
discussion of tax crimes and criminal enforcement of the tax laws, see 4 Laurence F. Casey
Federal Tax Practice § 13B (2015).
345
As the Tax Court explained, traditional penalties punish the “commission of crimes
while civil fraud additions to tax constitute remedial penalties.” Schachter v. Comm’r, 113
T.C. 192, 196 (1999), aff’d, 255 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2001).
346
4 Casey, supra note 344, § 13A:01.
347
Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 223, 226–27.
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so added to the duty shall, in all cases, be collected by the collector at
the same time and in the same manner with the duties.”348 In other
words, government officials simply added a percentage-based increase
to a taxpayer’s tax liability as a penalty for noncompliance with the tax
laws and collected the taxes and penalty at the same time. By contrast, a
person who provided an assessor of internal revenue with a false return
with the intention “to defeat or evade the valuation, enumeration, or
assessment” could be fined or imprisoned “upon conviction” by a
“district or circuit court of the United States.”349 These early penalty
provisions formed “the seed[s] from which the current penalty structure
grew.”350
Although the present IRC includes many more penalties than the early
revenue acts, both the civil/criminal distinction and the approach to
assessing and collecting civil penalties in the same manner as taxes
remain in place. The penalty provisions for false, inaccurate, or missing
tax returns moved from Civil War revenue legislation into the Revised
Statutes.351 In the short-lived Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894, Congress
clarified that criminal penalties—i.e. those imposed through the courts
alone—applied only to intentional conduct.352 During World War I,
Congress specified separate penalties for negligent actions as opposed to
those committed willfully.353 Finally, in 1954, Congress consolidated
most civil and criminal penalties into distinct subchapters of the IRC.354
From the Civil War into the early twentieth century, penalty provisions
had been scattered throughout parts of tax legislation addressing

348

Id.
Id. § 15. For an example of criminal prosecution under a revenue act, see United States
v. Ebner, 25 F. Cas. 973, 973 (D. Ind. 1867) (No. 15,020).
350
Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties—“They Shoot Dogs, Don’t They?”, 43 Fla. L.
Rev. 811, 823 (1991); see also Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083
(adding explicit negligence-based penalties).
351
See 1 Rev. Stat. §§ 3176, 3179, 3184 (1875).
352
Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509, 557. The Act reenacted the Civil War
statute but modified it to apply a one hundred percent penalty to “any return of a false or
fraudulent list or valuation intentionally.” Id. at 559.
353
Winslow, supra note 350, at 829–30.
354
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3 (current
version at 26 U.S.C. (2012)).
349
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different types of taxes.355 In 1954, Congress moved civil penalties into a
standalone subchapter entitled “Additions to the Tax and Additional
Amounts” and made clear that such penalties should be assessed and
collected in the same manner as taxes.356 It was also at this time that
Congress added the sentence of I.R.C. § 6671, referenced by the D.C.
Circuit in Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Department of the Treasury,
providing that “any reference in this title to ‘tax’ imposed by this title
shall be deemed also to refer to the penalties and liabilities provided by
this subchapter,” further signaling Congress’s understanding and intent
that civil penalties would be imposed using the same assessment and
collection procedures as taxes.357 Meanwhile, penalties administered
through the courts alone became part of a chapter entitled “Crimes,
Other Offenses, and Forfeitures.”358
The present IRC divides most civil penalties generally into
subcategories of “Additions to the Tax and Additional Amounts”359 and
“Assessable Penalties.”360 Civil penalties categorized as “Additions to
the Tax” or “Additional Amounts” are consolidated in subchapter A of
Chapter 68 of the IRC and typically correspond with a direct obligation
to pay taxes—e.g., failing to file a tax return and pay the associated
taxes due;361 paying taxes due with a bad check;362 or filing an inaccurate
return.363 Most of these penalties are computed on an ad valorem basis,
as a percentage of tax liability.364 Some subchapter A provisions speak
of “add[ing]” some amount “to the amount required to be shown as tax,”
without using the word “penalty” at all.365 Other subchapter A provisions
355

The penalty provisions remained scattered throughout the revenue acts, and this
persisted even in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Cf. I.R.C. §§ 2156, 2308, 2357, 2729,
2806 (Supp. V 1939) (providing examples of various penalty provisions).
356
See Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 6671–6674, 68A Stat. 3, 828 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6671–
6674 (1954)) (consolidating assessable penalty provisions); id. §§ 7201–7214 (consolidating
criminal penalty provisions).
357
I.R.C. § 6671(a) (1954).
358
Id. §§ 7201–7275.
359
I.R.C. Chapter 68, Subchapter A, covering §§ 6651–6665 (2012).
360
Id. at Chapter 68, Subchapter B, covering §§ 6671–6725.
361
Id. § 6651 (entitled “Failure to file tax return or to pay tax”).
362
Id. § 6657 (entitled “Bad checks”).
363
Id. § 6662 (entitled “Imposition of accuracy-related penalty on underpayments”).
364
4 Casey, supra note 344, § 13A:01 (making this observation).
365
I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2); see also id. §§ 6652(b), 6654(a), 6655(a) (using similar language).
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also use the word “penalty,” even as the amount in question is a
percentage of the associated tax.366
By comparison, civil penalties categorized as “Assessable Penalties”
are consolidated in subchapter B of Chapter 68 and tend to correspond
with filing or other requirements that do not reflect taxes owed by the
party making the filing—e.g., failing to collect and pay over taxes owed
by another taxpayer, as with the employee portion of payroll taxes;367
failing to file required informational reports;368 or failing to file returns
reporting the activities of pass-through entities like S corporations and
partnerships.369 Yet, several provisions within subchapter B speak of
such penalties being paid “in addition to the tax,”370 “in the same manner
as a tax,”371 or something similar.372 Irrespective of labels or other
terminology, I.R.C. § 6751, which imposes procedural requirements for
most of the civil penalties in both subchapters A and B of Chapter 68,
refers to them all as “penalt[ies].”373
Notwithstanding the consolidation of most civil penalties into a single
chapter of the IRC, a few civil penalty provisions lie elsewhere in the
IRC and thus might be thought to escape the characterization as a tax
imposed by I.R.C. § 6671. For example, the shared responsibility
payment at issue in NFIB v. Sebelius, which the Court in that case
recognized as a penalty rather than a tax for AIA purposes, is in I.R.C.
§ 5000A, in an entirely different subtitle from most of the IRC’s penalty
provisions.374 Nevertheless, as I.R.C. § 5000A makes clear, that penalty

366

Id. §§ 6653, 6656.
Id. § 6672 (entitled “Failure to collect and pay over tax, or attempt to evade or defeat
tax” and imposing a penalty equal to the amount required to be withheld and paid over).
368
See, e.g., id. § 6692 (entitled “Failure to file actuarial report”); id. § 6693 (entitled
“Failure to provide reports on certain tax-favored accounts or annuities”); id. § 6707 (entitled
“Failure to furnish information regarding reportable transactions”).
369
See, e.g., id. § 6698 (entitled “Failure to file partnership return”); id. § 6699 (entitled
“Failure to file S corporation return”).
370
Id. §§ 6715(a), 6715A(a), 6719(a).
371
Id. § 6724(b) (using this language in connection with penalties imposed by I.R.C.
§§ 6721, 6722, and 6723).
372
Id. § 6707A(b) (imposing a penalty of “75 percent of the decrease in tax shown on the
return as a result of” an unreported reportable transaction).
373
Id. § 6751(c).
374
Id. § 5000A; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543 (2012)
(discussing this provision).
367

HICKMANKERSKA_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE)

1744

Virginia Law Review

11/20/2017 9:53 AM

[Vol. 103:1683

too “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable
penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68.”375
In short, the IRC uses terms like “additions to the tax” and “penalty”
more or less interchangeably to describe civil penalties. Regardless of
the label, all of the above-described civil penalties are assessed and
collected in the same manner as taxes, whether as additions to tax or
separately imposed.376 Hence, virtually all civil penalties have been
referred to at one time or another as assessable penalties, as
distinguished from criminal ones, and irrespective of whether the IRC’s
text actually refers to them as such.
Turning once again to judicial interpretations of what constitutes a tax
for AIA purposes, courts often have held that civil penalties are taxes for
AIA purposes. In NFIB, the Court observed that “Congress can, of
course, describe something as a penalty but direct that it nonetheless be
treated as a tax for purposes of the [AIA].”377 As an example, the Court
pointed to the language in Section 6671 that deems “assessable
penalties” to be taxes.378 This observation from NFIB, albeit in dicta, is
in accord with longstanding precedent from courts of appeal.379 Indeed,
there are no apparent instances of courts treating civil penalties formally
categorized as “assessable penalties” as anything other than taxes.380
On the other hand, on a few occasions, the Supreme Court has
concluded that exactions labeled as taxes instead are penalties and thus
outside the scope of the AIA.381 The most prominent examples come
from a pair of companion cases involving the National Prohibition Act,
which authorized the IRS to collect a steep “tax” on those who sold

375

I.R.C. § 5000A.
See, e.g., id. § 6671 (providing that “assessable penalties” in Subchapter B of Chapter
68 “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes”).
377
567 U.S. at 544.
378
Id.
379
See, e.g., Nuttelman v. Vossberg, 753 F.2d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1985); Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 527 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1975).
380
Based on Westlaw searches involving the terms “no suit” and “penalty” within a
paragraph of each other, and “Anti-Injunction Act” and “penalty.”
381
For examples of courts of appeals decisions undertaking this same functionalist
reasoning, see Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 669–71 (7th Cir. 2013) (defining the
employer contraceptive coverage mandate tax under the Affordable Care Act as a penalty),
and Tovar v. Jarecki, 173 F.2d 449, 451–52 (7th Cir. 1949) (treating a steep marijuana tax as
a penalty for AIA purposes).
376
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liquor without a license.382 In Lipke v. Lederer, the Court noted that
“[t]he mere use of the word ‘tax’ in an act primarily designed to define
and suppress crime is not enough to show that within the true
intendment of the term a tax was laid.”383 Looking to how the “tax
functioned,” the Court determined that it “clearly involve[d] the idea of
punishment for infraction of the law—the quintessential function of a
penalty.”384 Although the Supreme Court in NFIB indicated that labels
matter,385 as Lipke showed, Congress’s choice to call an exaction a tax or
a penalty has not always been outcome determinative.386
The meaning of the word “tax” as used in the AIA has not been
litigated frequently. The mine run of AIA cases has involved sums that
fall comfortably under any definition of a tax. On rare occasions,
however, thorny issues have arisen when courts have been forced to
distinguish between taxes and penalties. As a general principle, when the
IRC calls upon IRS officials to assess and collect a penalty through the
civil assessment and collection process, the AIA will apply. But
sometimes, courts have disregarded statutory labels in evaluating the
AIA’s scope, suggesting that—recent jurisprudence notwithstanding—
those labels ought not be regarded as definitive.
Beyond the tax/penalty distinction, which has been an occasional
challenge throughout the AIA’s history, one wrinkle to the debate is
relatively new and worthy of mention: the extension of penalties to
taxpayers who disregard IRS rules and regulations. Like the
contemporary IRC,387 the Civil War revenue acts gave first assessors and
then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue authority to adopt “rules and
regulations” as needed to accomplish legislative purposes.388 Unlike
382
Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386, 389 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S.
557, 561 (1922); see also Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 304 U.S. 439, 448–49
(1938) (finding, albeit in dicta, that a tax related to the ticket sales for event admissions is a
penalty).
383
259 U.S. at 561.
384
Id. at 562.
385
567 U.S. at 543–45.
386
259 U.S. at 561–62.
387
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
388
Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, § 24, 12 Stat. 292, 300 (calling upon assessors
collectively to “make and establish such rules and regulations as to them shall appear
necessary for” effectuating the act’s provisions); Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 1, 12 Stat.
432, 432–33 (charging the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with “preparing all
the . . . regulations . . . which may be necessary to carry this act into effect”).
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today, however, no one in the 1860s would have understood that
language to confer quasi-legislative discretion on revenue officials.389 As
Justice Thomas Cooley wrote in his renowned 1879 tax treatise, in the
Civil War era, executive officials tasked with enforcing the tax laws
were expected to “keep strictly within the authority those laws confer,
and [not] add to or vary, in the slightest degree, any tax lawfully
levied.”390 “So inflexible is this rule,” he said, “that even the legislature
itself . . . cannot clothe them with its own authority” for the purpose of
enforcing the tax laws.391 Furthermore, courts in that era embraced the
principle that ambiguity in the tax laws should be construed to favor
taxpayers.392 Authority to adopt rules and regulations conferred a certain
amount of discretion, for instance regarding day-to-day procedural
matters or how and when to deploy enforcement resources, not the
power to adopt broad, legally binding substantive pronouncements.
Complete examination of the evolution of the relationship between
penalties and the discretionary powers of revenue officials is beyond the
scope of this Article. One of us has addressed that topic at length
elsewhere.393 When contemplating the tax/penalty distinction as it relates
to the AIA’s scope, however, it is worth at least noting that none of
Congress, revenue officials, or the courts would have contemplated
either that authority to adopt rules and regulations would confer the
broad policymaking discretion Treasury and the IRS enjoy today or that
declining to follow Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents
implementing and interpreting the IRC’s substantive terms might itself
be punishable through penalties that would be assessed and collected
like taxes.

389
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 488–91 (2002) (discussing late 1800s
understandings of rulemaking authority generally); cf. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for
Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537, 1564–68
(2006) (documenting similar understandings in the early 1900s).
390
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation 33 (1879).
391
Id.
392
Id. at 199–208.
393
E.g., Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 195, at 524–29; Hickman, IRB Guidance, supra
note 195, at 265–69; Hickman, supra note 389, at 1592–96.
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III. RESTORING THE ORIGINAL MEANING AND FUNCTION OF THE ANTIINJUNCTION ACT
Over the past half-century in particular, judicial interpretations of the
AIA have overgeneralized and lost sight of the AIA’s original scope and
purpose of protecting the IRS’s enforcement authority via the functions
of assessment and collection of tax revenues.394 Courts reflexively and
uncritically invoke the AIA as an efficient means of resolving the
convoluted claims of obvious tax scofflaws, most of whom were already
engaged directly with IRS collection processes anyway. In other
instances, the AIA undoubtedly seems like the narrowest ground for
resolving otherwise messy cases. In a truly unusual case with a
sympathetic party or other good reason for considering the merits, courts
can always make an exception. And when the IRS or the courts decline
to make an exception notwithstanding great potential hardship, Congress
can step in.
When it comes to pre-enforcement review of Treasury regulations and
IRS guidance documents, the problem with this approach should be
obvious: it removes the courts as a critical check against sweeping IRS
policymaking discretion, serving the convenience of the IRS and the
courts, but disserving taxpayers and the credibility of the tax system as a
whole. Often acceding to the IRS’s vision of “a world in which no
challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed loop of its taxing
authority,” courts have turned the AIA into an unjustified vestige of tax
exceptionalism and have allowed Treasury and the IRS to act without
the transparency and public accountability demanded by Congress
through the APA.395 This problem can be solved through restoring the
original purpose and design of the AIA.
The Supreme Court’s most recent TIA decision, Direct Marketing
Ass’n v. Brohl, most closely approximates the original understanding of
the AIA by recognizing that only a subset of tax cases fall within the
TIA’s, and thus the AIA’s, proper scope. As discussed earlier, despite
minor textual differences, the Court has always interpreted the AIA and
TIA in lockstep.396 But the Court in Direct Marketing left open just how
proximate a legal challenge must be before it “stops,” and thus
394

See supra Subsection I.A.1 (surveying contemporary AIA case law).
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
396
See supra Subsection I.A.3 (discussing the Supreme Court’s long history of interpreting
the TIA and AIA similarly).
395
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“restrains,” the assessment or collection of a tax.397 In other words, the
Court provided no test for determining precisely where to draw the line
operationally between stopping and inhibiting the assessment and
collection functions.
To fill this void, we draw from the historical analysis above, looking
not just to the AIA’s text and context but also its interaction with Civil
War tax administrative practices and their present-day analogues. Based
on that analysis, we propose an “engagement test” that focuses on
evidence of IRS engagement with taxpayers in enforcement contexts.
We believe that a test based on IRS engagement with taxpayers restores
the tighter temporal connection between the AIA and the assessment and
collection functions that Congress anticipated when it enacted the AIA.
Further, the engagement test brings the AIA into harmony with the APA
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the TIA by clearing the way
for pre-enforcement challenges to Treasury regulations, restoring
transparency and public accountability to tax administration.
Whether the AIA applies to limit pre-enforcement judicial review of
Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents is an issue of first
impression for the Supreme Court and most circuit courts, and the
Supreme Court’s past interpretations of the AIA are sufficiently varied
in their analysis that the courts should perceive their capacity to adopt
the engagement test and consider such cases as consistent with the text,
history, and purposes of the AIA and the IRC, as well as to bring the
AIA in line with the APA and the TIA. Recognizing, however, that the
courts’ past struggles to interpret the AIA may complicate their ability to
accomplish the desired coherence, we also offer a potential legislative
solution to the problem. Irrespective of whether the courts or Congress
provide the vehicle for clarifying the AIA’s scope, we address potential
counterarguments, including the frequently raised and always misguided
view that pre-enforcement review of Treasury regulations and IRS
guidance documents will hamper revenue collection excessively.

397

Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1133 (2015) (“The question—at least for
negative injunctions—is whether the relief to some degree stops ‘assessment, levy or
collection,’ not whether it merely inhibits them.”).
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A. Using History to Explain the Anti-Injunction Act’s Scope
By its plain language, the AIA blocks only those lawsuits that
“restrain[] the assessment or collection of [a] tax.”398 As the Supreme
Court has often observed, and has been outlined above, the terms
“assessment” and “collection” for this purpose refer to particular,
discrete, and well-defined procedures in tax administration. Assume, for
the sake of argument, two things: first, that the amount eventually to be
assessed and collected actually is a tax, rather than a penalty or some
other exaction—which, as noted above, can be its own murky question;
and second, as the courts always have, that the AIA does not bar judicial
review of every case that merely implicates the tax system but is at least
constrained by its own terms.399 With those assumptions, again, the
question becomes whether restraining the assessment and collection of
taxes means to stop them outright only when they are temporally
imminent, or merely to make those functions more challenging to
accomplish at some future time.400
In 1867, when the AIA was adopted, the only circumstances in which
a taxpayer might have sought injunctive relief from assessment or
collection would have occurred when revenue officials acted to enforce
the tax laws against particular taxpayers. Thus, a taxpayer’s request for
injunctive relief would have been temporally proximate to the actual
execution of the assessment and collection functions. Before Congress
passed the AIA in 1867, taxpayers might have challenged income tax
administration in court according to one of three conceivable scenarios.
Each has analogues in contemporary tax administration, all associated
with the initiation of IRS enforcement efforts.
The first centers on the filing and examination of tax returns.
Specifically, taxpayers might have sought to enjoin assessment during
the period after a tax return came due but before the assessors posted
proposed assessments. Recall, for example, that in the Civil War era,
taxpayers filed their income tax returns on May 1, but taxes were not
398
I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012) (“[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court . . . .”).
399
See, e.g., Cohen, 650 F.3d at 726 (citing Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 102, 104 (2004),
in rejecting the IRS’s arguments that “no challenge to its actions is ever outside the closed
loop of its taxing authority” and that “assessment and collection are part of a ‘single
mechanism’ that ultimately determines the amount of revenue the Treasury retains”).
400
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (raising this question).
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immediately assessed and would not come due until June 30.401 During
the two-month interim, assessors of internal revenue maintained
authority to investigate any tax returns that they believed to be
inaccurate. The assessments that the assessors eventually proposed could
incorporate the results of those investigations as well as the tax returns
as filed. Also, if a taxpayer failed to file a return, assessors could prepare
a return on the taxpayer’s behalf and propose assessments on that basis.
At least in theory, finding themselves under investigation by their local
assessors, taxpayers might have sued to stop such inquiries from leading
to higher-than-anticipated proposed assessments. Functionally, such preassessment investigations are most analogous to the commencement of
an examination or audit today, which usually occurs after a tax return is
filed,402 although in some cases when a taxpayer has failed to file.403
Second, and perhaps at least somewhat more likely, taxpayers who
believed their proposed assessments as posted on the public lists to be
inaccurate might have sought to enjoin assessors from finalizing those
assessments.404 Recall that in the Civil War era, assessors posted lists of
proposed assessments and entertained taxpayer appeals prior to
submitting final lists of tax assessments to the collectors. Today, taxes
are due and automatically assessed upon the filing of a tax return, and
most taxes are paid in advance through third-party withholding and
estimated tax payments.405 Consequently, the closest contemporary
analogues to this former practice would be the issuance of a notice of
deficiency,406 or perhaps the issuance of a letter notifying the subject of

401

See supra Section II.A (describing Civil War–era administrative procedures).
1 Casey, supra note 344, § 3:36 (discussing the examination process).
403
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6020 (authorizing the IRS to prepare and file a tax return on behalf of
a taxpayer who has failed to file); Internal Revenue Manual § 4.12.1 (Oct. 5, 2010)
(outlining the examination process for “nonfiled returns,” including but not limited to
preparing a return on the taxpayer’s behalf).
404
See Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 15, 12 Stat. 432, 439–40 (stating that assessors
must make the lists of tax liability public and that such lists should remain in public for
fifteen days); see also supra Section II.A (describing Civil War–era administrative
procedures).
405
See supra Section II.C (making this observation).
406
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6213(a) (precluding the IRS from assessing a deficiency generally
until ninety days after sending a statutory notice of deficiency to the taxpayer in question);
Internal Revenue Manual § 4.8.5.1.2 (Oct. 5, 2017) (“By law, the Service has the authority to
make the appropriate assessments once the examination is completed and the taxpayer has
402
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the results of an audit and the opportunity for an administrative appeal
thereof, typically made thirty days prior to the issuance of a deficiency
notice.407
Finally, in the Civil War era, taxpayers could and did bring suits to
stop revenue collection procedures after assessment occurred.408 Indeed,
this was the most common scenario at the time. The contemporary
analogue is the same—filing suit to stop IRS post-assessment collection
efforts.409
Further historical context supports the proposition that these three
examples, and their contemporary analogues, represent the AIA’s proper
range. Before 1875, Congress had yet to vest courts with federal
question jurisdiction.410 As the IRS at that time assessed and collected
taxes entirely through local officials, diversity jurisdiction was also
unavailable.411 Injunctive relief was only available when injury to
established legal or equitable rights was judged to be particularized, as
well as imminent and irreparable.412 Thus, the typical suit to which the
AIA would have applied at the time of its enactment was a suit to enjoin
individual revenue officials, specifically collectors, in state court.413
been appropriately notified of the audit results.”); 1 Casey, supra note 344, § 2.07
(summarizing the relationship between deficiency notices and the assessment function).
407
Treas. Reg. § 601.105(d) (1967) (providing for notice of examination results and
opportunity for administrative appeal thirty days prior to the issuance of a statutory notice of
deficiency); 1 Casey, supra note 344, § 3.63 (describing the thirty-day letter).
408
Revenue Act of 1862 § 19 (providing that collectors would receive a final list of tax
liabilities from the assessors, then requiring collectors to give taxpayers ten days’ notice
before pursuing additional collection procedures); supra Section II.A (discussing same).
409
I.R.C. § 6303 (calling for the initiation of collection proceedings “as soon as
practicable, and within 60 days, after the making of an assessment of a tax”); see also 1
Casey, supra note 344, § 2.02 (observing that “[a]n assessment is required . . . before the
[IRS] can take administrative action to collect an unpaid liability”).
410
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2012)); Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986).
411
See supra Section II.A (explaining early assessment and collection practices).
412
See, e.g., 1 High, supra note 246, § 1 (“Nor will a court of equity lend its aid by
injunction for the enforcement of right or the prevention of wrong in the abstract, and
unconnected with any injury or damage to the person seeking the relief.”); id. § 7 (“And it is
incumbent upon the party seeking relief by interlocutory injunction to show some clear legal
or equitable rights, and a well-grounded apprehension of immediate injury to those rights.”).
413
Whether state courts actually possessed the authority to enjoin federal officers like
assessors and collectors was in some doubt, see generally Richard S. Arnold, The Power of
State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 Yale L.J. 1385 (1964), but state courts did
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Also, even at the time of the Civil War, courts generally considered
the availability of an administrative appeal to preclude equitable
relief.414 At the time Congress adopted the AIA, the revenue laws
afforded taxpayers an administrative appeal of proposed assessments
before they became final.415 In other words, once engaged with revenue
officials to a sufficient degree to be able to state a claim upon which
injunctive relief could be based, even without the AIA, taxpayers
arguably would not have been able to seek injunctive relief until they
first exhausted their opportunity for appeal with their local assessor or,
later, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thus, at the time Congress
adopted the AIA, the courts were unlikely to entertain a suit for
injunctive relief before the taxpayer engaged with revenue officials
acting in an enforcement capacity.
In summary, all of the scenarios in which a taxpayer might have
sought injunctive relief in 1867, and for a substantial period of time
thereafter, involved direct and particular engagement between revenue
officials—specifically, local assessors and collectors—and taxpayers,
with timing proximate to the active pursuit of the assessment and
collection functions by those officials. Once a taxpayer filed a return and
sometimes grant such injunctions. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bean, 14 F. Cas. 689, 690
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1875) (No. 7,853) (considering whether an injunction granted by a state
court to restrain the sale of property by tax collector could be sustained in light of the AIA).
The Revenue Act of 1866 specifically authorized (but did not require) defendant revenue
officials to petition for removal of such cases to federal court prior to trial, which often
occurred. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 98, 171–72; see also, e.g.,
Delaware R.R. Co. v. Prettyman, 7 F. Cas. 408, 408 (C.C.D. Del. 1872) (No. 3,767) (noting
that action seeking injunction to restrain collection of assessed taxes had been removed from
state court to federal court as per congressional authorization); Howland v. Soule, 12 F. Cas.
743, 744 (C.C.D. Cal. 1868) (No. 6,800) (describing the case as brought initially in state
court to enjoin collection).
414
See, e.g., 1 High, supra note 246, § 493 (“Where, therefore, a particular manner is
provided by law, or a particular tribunal designated, for the settlement and decision of all
errors or inequalities on behalf of persons dissatisfied with a tax, they must avail themselves
of the legal remedy thus prescribed, and will not be allowed to waive such relief and seek in
equity to enjoin the collection of the tax.”); cf. Rio Grande R.R. Co. v. Scanlan, 44 Tex. 649,
651 (1876) (“A party asking for this extraordinary relief must have used all proper means to
obviate the necessity of appealing to the court.”); 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 943 (2017) (stating
that “the taxpayer seeking relief from an alleged illegal and unjust assessment must first
exhaust all of his or her legal remedies, including the remedies before administrative
boards”).
415
See Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 15, 12 Stat. 432, 437 (providing for an appeal of
the initial assessment to the district assessor).
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revenue officials began investigating its veracity or made a proposed or
final assessment, judicial review necessarily would stop the assessment
or collection functions.416 And once that initial engagement occurred, the
AIA operated to allow revenue officials to administer the tax laws and
pursue the assessment and collection functions to completion unimpeded
by judicial intervention.
Based on this understanding of tax administrative practices in 1867
and their contemporary analogues, we can formulate and hereby propose
an engagement test that would limit the AIA’s scope to those cases in
which the IRS has initiated enforcement proceedings of one manner or
another against a particular taxpayer. As a procedural matter, the
government would bear the burden of proving the AIA’s applicability by
demonstrating the engagement of its enforcement apparatus with the
taxpayer in question. But the government need only show evidence of
engagement with a taxpayer about a potential issue or liability to
successfully invoke the APA.
Helpfully, the contemporary analogues to all of the above-described
three historical scenarios involve a paper trail—e.g., the taxpayer files a
tax return; the IRS initiates correspondence with the taxpayer, for
example, to notify the taxpayer of its intent to examine a return as filed
or to inquire about the taxpayer’s failure to file;417 the IRS sends a thirtyday letter or a statutory notice of deficiency;418 or the IRS sends a letter
demanding payment of an assessed tax liability.419 Thus, for example,
once a taxpayer files a tax return and the IRS assesses the associated
taxes, any lawsuit disputing such taxes or seeking to prevent their
collection could be countered by producing the return as filed and any
IRS correspondence related thereto. If the IRS selects a tax return for
examination or inquires regarding the failure to file a tax return, then
any lawsuit seeking to stop the assessment or collection functions
incident to that audit could be countered, and the AIA invoked, by
producing the associated correspondence with the taxpayer.420
416

For a discussion of early assessment procedures, see Section II.A.
See, e.g., Internal Revenue Manual § 4.4.7.3 (Sept. 22, 2014) (detailing the types of
letters sent by IRS officials to taxpayers during the examination process).
418
See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2012) (providing for a statutory notice of deficiency prior to
assessment); Treas. Reg. § 601.105(d) (1967) (providing for thirty-day letter).
419
See I.R.C. § 6303(a) (providing for notice demanding payment).
420
See supra note 407 and accompanying text (observing, for example, that an audit is
typically preceded by a letter from the IRS to the taxpayer).
417
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In a few situations, application of the engagement test may be more
challenging. One such example might be a third-party summons, where
the IRS is acting in an enforcement capacity with a paper trail, but the
taxpayer in question may not be aware.421 Applying the engagement test
may also be more challenging in cases of large corporations
participating in the Compliance Assurance Program, whereby they work
with the IRS to resolve potential issues before a tax return is filed, or
otherwise engaged with the IRS on a more routine basis.422
Under the engagement test, however, the AIA generally would no
longer bar pre-enforcement review of Treasury regulations or IRS
guidance documents. Pre-enforcement review, by its very definition,
refers to challenges to rules and regulations raised prior to agency
enforcement efforts.423 Taxpayers who file APA-based claims before the
IRS begins exploring whether a particular rule or regulation applies to a
particular taxpayer’s facts and circumstances would be afforded judicial
review of those claims.
B. Justifying a Narrower Anti-Injunction Act
The engagement test both restores the AIA to its original scope and
respects its purpose. As courts have recognized repeatedly, Congress’s
broad purpose with the AIA was to provide the government with a
constant stream of revenue. Today, the pay-as-you-go taxation system of
third-party withholding and advance estimated tax payments largely
satisfies that goal. Meanwhile, by focusing on those lawsuits that arise
after the IRS has already engaged a taxpayer about its own particular tax
liability, the engagement test allows the AIA to function in the
enforcement context to require administrative exhaustion and protect
IRS efforts to pursue additional revenue from recalcitrant taxpayers.
Lawsuits that would directly and immediately stop the IRS from
pursuing the assessment and collection functions against those taxpayers
would be blocked, requiring them to utilize the agency appeals and
avenues to judicial review provided by the IRC.

421

See Kafka & Cavanagh, supra note 19, ¶ 20.05.
1 Casey, supra note 344, § 3:48.50 (describing the Compliance Assurance Process).
423
For an extended discussion of pre-enforcement review of agency actions under various
statutory schemes, see Frederick Davis, Judicial Review of Rulemaking: New Patterns and
New Problems, 1981 Duke L.J. 279.
422
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In the meantime, however, the engagement test harmonizes the AIA
with the APA. Recall that the APA embodies a presumption in favor of
judicial review as a mechanism of ensuring that the APA’s goals of
agency transparency and accountability are satisfied.424 It is a wellsettled principle of statutory construction that courts should construe
conflicting statutory provisions in a way that gives maximum effect to
both.425 That principle applies even more to conflicts with the APA.
Congress, in Section 559 of the APA, expressly instructed courts to read
the APA and specific statutes like the AIA so as to give maximum effect
to both.426 Along those lines, the Court has recognized that Congress
adopted the APA “to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and
diversity,” that of judicial review of final administrative action.427
By limiting the scope of the AIA to allow pre-enforcement review of
Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents, the engagement test
strikes a balance between protecting tax enforcement efforts and giving
effect to the APA’s presumption in favor of judicial review. The
engagement test would easily exclude from the AIA’s scope, and thus
would allow courts to consider, those challenges that are only indirectly
or tangentially related to day-to-day enforcement. Thus, a court could
consider the claims of taxpayers seeking to challenge on a preenforcement basis the facial validity of Treasury regulations or IRS
guidance documents enforceable by penalties, so long as the case does
not arise as a consequence of IRS enforcement against noncompliance.
But the engagement test also would allow the AIA to function fully in
cases with actual tax dollars at stake. Where revenue collections are not
proximately threatened by judicial review, and thus the central purpose
of the AIA is not implicated, then the engagement test gives full effect to
the APA by permitting claims to go forward.
424
See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (observing that “the
Administrative Procedure Act . . . embodies the basic presumption of judicial review”).
425
See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533
(1995); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154–55 (1976).
426
See 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) (stating that a “[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to
supersede or modify this subchapter . . . except to the extent that it does so expressly”); see
also Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 246 (2010) (Halpern,
J., concurring in the result); Brief of Amicus Curiae Prof. Kristin E. Hickman in Support of
Respondents at 15, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012)
(No. 11-139), 2011 WL 6813230, at *15.
427
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999).
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Finally, the engagement test brings the AIA in alignment with the
TIA as interpreted in Direct Marketing428 and also positions the AIA as a
clear jurisdictional rule. The Supreme Court, in Direct Marketing,
restated the bedrock principle of statutory interpretation that
jurisdictional rules must be clear.429 Although the Court has not
conclusively determined whether the AIA is in fact jurisdictional, clarity
is, in any event, generally considered to be a positive feature of legal
rules.430 As described above, in the vast majority of cases, the
engagement test would be very easy to apply. The IRS would bear the
burden of proof in establishing engagement but, in most cases, would be
easily able to present evidence of correspondence with the taxpayer
regarding the disputed sums.
C. A Legislative Alternative
Although the above historical account of the AIA provides substantial
support for construing the AIA narrowly to permit pre-enforcement
review of Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents, courts may
nevertheless feel constrained by the existing jurisprudence, problematic
as it may be. Another way to address the proper construction of the AIA
is through legislation. Congress has amended the AIA in the past to
permit judicial review where the IRS or the courts applied it too
expansively.431 Congress has the power to do so again.
To that end, we propose that Section 7421 be amended or a new
provision added to the IRC to adopt language resembling the following:
Notwithstanding section 7421(a), not later than 60 days after the
promulgation of a rule or regulation under authority granted by this
title, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by such rule or
regulation may file a petition for judicial review of such regulation
with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
428
Direct Mktg., 135 S. Ct. at 1132–33 (constraining the TIA’s scope to circumstances
more directly proximate to the assessment and collection functions, aligned with traditional
equitable principles).
429
Id. at 1131 (stating that the Supreme Court has a “rule favoring clear boundaries in the
interpretation of jurisdictional statutes”).
430
Hawley, supra note 215, at 124 (“Jurisdictional boundaries are well served by clarity,
and the government and litigants alike would benefit from consistency in the preenforcement review of tax challenges.”).
431
See supra Subsection II.B.1 (discussing exceptions to the AIA adopted by Congress).
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or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal
place of business.

Beyond the need to clarify the meaning of the AIA to coordinate better
with the APA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the TIA, a few
additional considerations shape this language.
First, the reference to rules or regulations, rather than merely
regulations, is a deliberate choice. Although some provisions authorizing
Treasury and the IRS to adopt legally binding pronouncements
regarding the scope and content of the IRC reference regulations only,432
many such provisions are more expansive in authorizing “rules or
regulations” or “rules and regulations.”433 In particular, I.R.C. § 7805(a)
sweepingly authorizes “all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title.”434 Additionally, many of the IRC’s penalty
provisions speak in terms of failure to comply with “rules and
regulations.”435 Treasury regulations have interpreted that phrase for
penalty purposes as including not only temporary and final Treasury
regulations but also “revenue rulings or notices (other than notices of
proposed rulemaking) issued by the [IRS] and published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin.”436 The IRS has suggested that some revenue
procedures may be included as well.437 If a Treasury or IRS
pronouncement can serve as a basis for asserting penalties, then
assuming other justiciability limitations have been satisfied, the AIA
ought not provide a basis for cutting off pre-enforcement review.

432

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1252(b), 1552(a) (2012) (authorizing “regulations”).
See, e.g., id. § 401(n) (authorizing “such rules or regulations as may be necessary to
coordinate” that provision with others specified); id. § 1502 (authorizing “regulations” in
one sentence but “rules” in the next, seemingly interchangeably).
434
Id. § 7805(a).
435
See, e.g., id. § 6662(b)(1) (imposing penalties on taxpayers who underreport and
underpay their taxes due to “negligence or disregard of rules or regulations”); id.
§ 6694(b)(2)(B) (sanctioning tax return preparers for “a reckless or intentional disregard of
rules or regulations”).
436
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (1991); see also Accuracy-Related Penalty, T.D.
8381, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,492, 67,494 (Dec. 31, 1991), 1992-1 C.B. 374, 376 (adopting the
regulatory definition).
437
Accuracy-Related Penalty, 56 Fed. Reg. at 67,494 (stating that revenue procedures
“may or may not be treated as ‘rules or regulations’ depending on all facts and
circumstances”).
433
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Some IRC provisions are phrased even more broadly, authorizing
“guidance, rules, or regulations.”438 Including guidance within an
exception from the AIA would be a mistake, however. The tax
community sometimes uses the term “guidance” to refer not only to
Treasury regulations and authoritative IRS documents that arguably
carry legal force but also to a whole host of informal IRS
pronouncements that expressly carry no legal weight whatsoever.439
Administrative law doctrine often rejects judicial review of informal,
nonbinding agency pronouncements for fear of chilling all agency
communications with the general public, which in turn are thought to be
desirable as a matter of transparency and good government.440 For this
reason, extending a pre-enforcement review exception from the AIA to
encompass everything that might be termed guidance seems a step too
far. By restricting a legislative amendment to the AIA to rules and
regulations, Congress should capture IRS guidance formats that carry
legal weight while excluding those that do not.
Second, although the proposed sixty-day limitation for raising an
APA challenge is arbitrary, limiting the time period for raising a preenforcement challenge to tax rules and regulations accomplishes
important goals as well. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 provides a six-year general
statute of limitations on APA-based challenges to the validity of agency
regulations.441 An extensive jurisprudence exists elaborating the
contours of that provision.442 Declining to specify a time limit in
438

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(5)(H), 280G(e)(2)(C)(ii).
See, e.g., Understanding IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer, Internal Revenue Serv.,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https://perma.cc/6CN588NZ] (last updated July 6, 2016) (offering a partial list of IRS guidance documents, only
some of which have the capacity to lead to the imposition of penalties on taxpayers); see
generally Rogovin & Korb, supra note 191 (recognizing and describing at least twenty-eight
Treasury and IRS guidance formats ranging from regulations to news releases and oral
communications).
440
See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
441
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012). This six-year limitations period presumably would not
apply in the tax context at all if Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents are not
eligible for pre-enforcement review because of the AIA. See Kristin E. Hickman, Altera
Meets
Chamber
of
Commerce,
TaxProf
Blog
(Oct.
17,
2017)
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/10/hickman-altera-meets-chamber-ofcommerce.html [https://perma.cc/HD7L-TG8K] (discussing the potential applicability of 28
U.S.C. § 2401(a) in the tax context).
442
1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 7.15 (5th ed. 2009); 2 id. § 11.7.
439

HICKMANKERSKA_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Restoring the Lost Anti-Injunction Act

11/20/2017 9:53 AM

1759

amending the AIA would allow legislators and courts to rely by default
on that jurisprudence to determine which claims are cut off by the
expiration of the limitations period. But many statutes contain more
restrictive limitations of the time for raising pre-enforcement challenges
to agency regulations.443 These provisions prompt judicial review, which
leads to certainty in the law.444 Taxpayers value legal certainty so that
they may organize their affairs and file their tax returns. Imposing a
stricter time limit thus balances providing an avenue to judicial review
for parties directly and immediately affected by Treasury regulations or
IRS guidance with accommodating taxpayers’ desire for certainty.
One question imposing a time limit in this fashion might raise,
however, is whether such language would in turn preclude taxpayers
engaged in refund or deficiency actions from challenging the validity of
Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents at that later time.445
Specifying a sixty-day limitation on the time for seeking judicial review
arguably suggests that later actions are precluded. The six-year
limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2401 forecloses many, though not all,
subsequent claims that a regulation is invalid.446 As one court observed,
“[d]ifferent legal wrongs give rise to different rights of action,” and “[a]
federal regulation that makes it six years without being contested does
not enter a promised land free from legal challenge.”447 On the other
hand, using the word “may” rather than “shall” suggests optionality.
Section 703 of the APA provides that, “[e]xcept to the extent that prior,
adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by
law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal
proceedings for judicial enforcement.”448 Putting the permissive
language of the above-proposed AIA amendment together with this
language from the APA would signal that Congress means to allow
different parties to challenge the validity of final agency actions in both
443

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1193(e)(1), 1262(e)(3)(A), 1474(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 360kk(d)(1);
28 U.S.C. § 2344; 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1).
444
See Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 1141 (7th ed. 2016) (making this point).
445
See id. (recognizing this issue with interpretation of the Hobbs Act).
446
See, e.g., Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 772 F.3d 899, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(recognizing “‘reopener’ doctrine” as an exception from 28 U.S.C. § 2401, “giving rise to a
‘new right of action’ even though the regulation challenged is no different,” citing circuit
precedent).
447
Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809, 820–21 (6th Cir. 2015).
448
5 U.S.C. § 703 (emphasis added).
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pre-enforcement and enforcement-based litigation. Nevertheless,
specifying as much expressly in amending the AIA could avoid this
issue.
Finally, in amending the AIA to permit pre-enforcement review of
Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents, Congress may want
to consider incorporating a cross-reference to the new provision in the
Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), with which the AIA is often linked.
The DJA contains a tax exception preventing courts from providing
declaratory relief for controversies “with respect to Federal Taxes,” also
with a few specific exceptions.449 The courts generally have declared the
AIA and the DJA to be coextensive and have focused their analysis of
the combined limitation on judicial review principally on the former.450
Nevertheless, the IRS has taken the position that the DJA is even more
limiting of judicial review than the AIA.451 If Congress amends the AIA
as suggested by this Article, incorporating a cross-reference would
resolve conclusively any corresponding dispute over the DJA’s
meaning.
D. Countervailing Concerns
The principal objection to any narrowing of the AIA is that the IRS’s
ability to collect revenue will be impaired. In lower-court cases
considering the AIA after Direct Marketing, the government has
consistently made this claim.452 Nevertheless, when one appreciates first,

449

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
See, e.g., Ambort v. United States, 392 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In practical
effect, these two statutes are coextensive . . . .”); Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291,
299–300 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he two statutory texts are, in underlying intent and practical
effect, coextensive.” (quoting UMWA 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99
F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1996))); Nat’l Taxpayers Union v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1435
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Because the AIA and DJA operate coterminously, the following analysis
of the impact of the AIA upon NTU’s complaint also determines the effect of the DJA.”); cf.
Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n.10 (1974) (recognizing the
lower courts’ treatment of the two provisions).
451
Internal Revenue Serv., Litigation Guideline Memorandum GL-52, 1991 WL 1167968,
(June 28, 1991); see also, e.g., En Banc Brief for the Appellee at 41–43, Cohen v. United
States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (No. 08-5093), 2010 WL 3514351, at *52–
54 (arguing in favor of such interpretation).
452
E.g., Final Brief for the Appellees at 27–31, Maze v. IRS, No. 16-5265 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
12, 2017), 2017 WL 1353543, at *27–31; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
450
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that most tax revenues now are received by the government prior to
formal assessment and collection procedures as a result of pay-as-yougo taxation methods like wage withholding and advance estimated tax
payments,453 and second, that not all Treasury regulations or IRS
guidance documents relate directly to revenue raising,454 it becomes easy
to see that this argument proves too much.
Many social welfare programs take the form of tax deductions or
credits that offset income earned or taxes owed.455 Treasury regulations
and IRS guidance documents defining eligibility for those social welfare
programs thus relate directly to the ultimate calculation of an
individual’s tax liability. Yet the goal of those pronouncements is not to
raise revenue for the government. Many Treasury regulations and IRS
guidance documents serve regulatory functions that are only part of the
tax laws to the extent they are enforceable by civil penalties collected by
the IRS.456 Again, the goal of those pronouncements is not to raise
revenue for the government but to define and prompt compliance with
the associated regulatory requirements. Consequently, judicial review of
pre-enforcement challenges to the validity of such Treasury regulations
and IRS guidance documents do not really threaten revenue collection in
any meaningful way.
Concededly, the engagement test is inconsistent with some of the
broader rhetoric in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bob Jones
University v. Simon457 and Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc.458 In
those cases, the disputed taxes at stake were those of potential
contributors who would be denied deductions after the IRS made a
501(c)(3) status determination with respect to donee organizations.
Although the engagement test we propose arguably would be triggered
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction at 25, Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-cv-944-LY
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2016).
453
See supra Section II.C (explaining changes in the timing of the assessment and
collection functions vis a vis most tax payments).
454
See supra Subsection I.B.2 (providing background on the current function of Treasury
regulations).
455
See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text (detailing the social welfare aspects of
the contemporary Internal Revenue Code).
456
See supra notes 209–11 and accompanying text (describing the conduct-regulating
nature of Treasury regulations).
457
416 U.S. 725 (1974).
458
416 U.S. 752 (1974).
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by virtue of the communications between the IRS and the donee
organizations regarding the latter’s exempt status, such was not the basis
for the Court’s decisions in those cases. As discussed earlier, it is
difficult to reconcile the Court’s holding in Direct Marketing with some
of the reasoning of these two cases.459
For example, Direct Marketing conflicts with dicta from Americans
United about interfering with the potential for collecting taxes from third
parties. In Americans United, the Court stated the AIA blocks suits that
would interfere with the assessment of taxes against third parties not
party to the suit and pointed to language in the AIA regarding its
application “whether or not [the person bringing suit] is the person
against whom such tax was assessed.”460 The Court did not rely on this
claim in reaching its decision; the issuance of an injunction in
Americans United would have stopped the IRS from assessing
employment taxes against the nonprofit bringing suit as well.461 The
nonprofit offered to pay those taxes voluntarily in order to have its
constitutional claim heard, prompting the Supreme Court to add a line in
the opinion about third-party taxation.
Moreover, in addition to being dicta, the Court’s point in Americans
United about the AIA’s language regarding third parties misinterprets its
meaning. As documented in Part II above, this reference was added to
the AIA in 1966 to correspond with I.R.C. § 7426, which in turn
addresses situations in which the IRS seeks to levy and sell property
owned by one person to satisfy an assessed tax liability owed by
another, for example, as in the case of jointly owned property.462 By
adding the “whether or not such person” language in addition to this new
exception, Congress ensured that only third parties who may challenge
such collection actions are those described in I.R.C. § 7426. Contrary to
the Court’s dicta in Americans United, the amendment was not intended
to extend the AIA’s scope to cases that might hypothetically affect
eventual assessments against unrelated parties.
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court may need to choose between
constraining either Bob Jones and Americans United or Direct
459
See supra notes 44–48 (discussing Bob Jones and Americans United in greater detail)
and notes 166–68 (explaining how those cases conflict with Direct Marketing).
460
416 U.S. at 760; see also I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
461
416 U.S. at 760.
462
See supra notes 262–65 and accompanying text (describing the enactment of the thirdparty exception from the AIA).
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Marketing to their particular facts. For its part, Congress already
provided guidance on which precedent it prefers: in the aftermath of Bob
Jones and Americans United, Congress created an exception to the AIA
to allow judicial review of 501(c)(3) status determination letters and
effectively reverse the Court’s decisions in those two cases.463
Finally, the engagement test could, to some extent, encourage plaintiff
shopping as taxpayers seek to challenge Treasury regulations or IRS
guidance documents in a coordinated fashion. Additionally, interpreting
the AIA to allow pre-enforcement judicial review of such
pronouncements does not automatically cut off APA-based challenges in
the context of refund or deficiency actions. Consider two otherwise
identical taxpayers seeking to enjoin a new Treasury regulation based on
APA claims. The first brings suit immediately after the regulation
becomes final and before IRS starts enforcement. Under the engagement
test, the suit would go forward notwithstanding the AIA. The second
taxpayer waits until the IRS examines its tax return and issues a
deficiency notice, then files the exact same legal challenge against the
relevant IRS pronouncement. The IRC contains no statute of limitations
for pre-enforcement challenges to rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, although the default six-year limit on claims against the
government would apply in many cases to prevent post-enforcement
challenges too many years past promulgation.464
Despite at least some potential for both pre- and post-enforcement
challenges, there are nevertheless benefits to opening up Treasury
regulations and IRS guidance documents to pre-enforcement challenges.
By interpreting the AIA to allow APA-based challenges to be brought
pre-enforcement, the courts would increase certainty in the tax laws by
promoting earlier judicial review of Treasury regulations and IRS
guidance documents. The plaintiffs would receive guidance on the

463

See supra notes 50, 280–81 and accompanying text (providing that Congress amended
the AIA to create a new exception for status determination letters in the wake of Bob Jones
and Americans United).
464
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012) (stating that, unless other provided, “every civil action
commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years after the right of action first accrues”); P & V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
516 F.3d 1021, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (applying the time limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) to
a claim brought under the APA); see also 1 Pierce, supra note 442, § 7.15 (discussing the
operation and implications of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)); 2 id. § 11.7 (same).
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implications of their future conduct, as the IRS presumably would
usually receive prompt validation of its regulations.
CONCLUSION
In the Civil War era, when the system of internal taxation was small
and the discretionary powers of executive officials were much more
constrained, Congress enacted the AIA to prevent taxpayers from using
the courts to stop the mechanics of the assessment and collection
functions once those functions had commenced. Congress passed the
AIA to ensure a steady stream of needed revenue into federal coffers
during the Civil War by requiring tax grievances that arose during those
administrative processes to be heard through administrative appeals, or
later through refund suits. Because of the timing of the assessment and
collection functions with respect to most tax payments, Congress needed
the AIA to protect that revenue stream. And, because of that same
timing, the AIA could only come into play after the commencement of
those functions.
In the succeeding 150 years, changes in tax administrative practices,
as well as the expansion of the tax system’s coverage and, along with it,
the discretionary authority exercised by tax administrators have opened
the door to construing the AIA much more broadly than Congress in
1867, or perhaps even decades later, ever would have contemplated.
Particularly in recent decades, the courts have sometimes interpreted the
AIA to suggest that virtually any litigation concerning taxes falls under
its purview. Meanwhile the federal tax system increasingly serves social
welfare and regulatory functions beyond the IRS’s traditional mission of
collecting revenue to support the federal government. As the goals of the
tax system and tax administration have changed, courts (and Congress)
have failed to consider whether reflexively applying the AIA to virtually
all litigation implicating the IRC remains sensible or whether the AIA
has become another vestige of unjustified tax exceptionalism.
Generalist judges typically are not fond of tax cases. Many tax cases
are frivolous. The AIA offers overburdened generalist judges an easy
and efficient basis for disposing of a group of cases that do not capture
their interest. But interpreting the AIA overbroadly misapprehends the
text, history, and purpose of the AIA as it fits within the IRC and tax
administration as a whole.
It is time for the courts to rediscover lost limitations on the AIA’s
reach. The Supreme Court’s decisions in the Mayo Foundation and
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Direct Marketing cases, and the new wave of post–Mayo Foundation,
APA-based challenges to Treasury regulations and IRS guidance
documents, offer the courts an opportunity to reconsider the AIA’s
proper meaning and scope. By adopting an engagement test for
evaluating whether litigation actually stops tax assessment and
collection efforts in progress, the courts can restore the AIA to its
original scope and purpose of facilitating IRS enforcement efforts while
also serving the APA’s intended function of checking government
overreach.
If the courts do not act to clarify the AIA’s meaning and scope,
however, then Congress should do so through legislation. Treasury and
IRS rules and regulations, like those of other agencies, should be subject
to judicial review to ensure compliance with the requirements of the
APA, which foster good government objectives such as public
participation, transparency, and accountability. Tax administration will
be better for it.

